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This thesis investigates the types of competition that
exist during the different acquisition phases of a weapon
system procurement, and discusses the possible effects that
competition has on the acquisition cost of these systems.
Also, economic, technical, and management variables are
presented and discussed that may have a significant impact
when considering whether to introduce production competition
into a program. Five second sourcing methodologies are
presented and discussed along with their relative advantages
and disadvantages, and a model is presented which allows for
a comparison to be performed between the five second sourcing
methods. The proposed acquisition strategy for the Advanced
Assault Amphibian Vehicle (AAAV) is presented and analyzed as
it concerns design and production competition. An analysis
of the AAAV program variables is performed, with accompanying
economic analysis, which indicates that a Contractor Teaming
strategy would be appropriate for introducing production
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Competition in the acquisition of major weapon systems
has emerged in the last few years both as a statutory
requirement and a major issue in a national debate before
Congress and the general public. This situation was brought
to the forefront of national attention by many factors, but
perhaps chiefly due to the problems of cost overruns and the
well publicized cases of questionable pricing by some sole
source contractors. This situation did not, however, start
in 1988 or even in this century, but was first observed as
early as 1794 when Congress authorized the construction of
six frigates for the Navy. Of the six frigates authorized,
only three were eventually built due to cost increases over
the projected costs. In more recent times the cost of Air
Force's B-l bomber, a sole source contract with Rockwell
International, rose in the 15 months between January 1981 and
March 1982 from $11.9 billion to $25 billion (excluding
inflation) [Ref. l:p. 357]. Also a 1979 General Accounting
Office (GAO) report dealing with 58 major acquisitions
estimated the total projected costs of the systems to be $235
billion, of which $127 billion had been funded, leaving $97
billion in cost overruns to be funded from future revenues
[Ref. 2:p. 11].
Evaluating these figures in light of past, current, and
future projected Federal budget deficits provides all
concerned parties ample reason to attempt to initiate cost
saving measures in weapon system procurement. One
predominant reason often espoused by analysts for cost growth
is the lack of competition during the development and
production of a weapon system. Such competition, it is
believed, would act as a catalyst for enhancing both realism
in cost projections and cost stability in production.
B. OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH
The objectives of this study are to: (1) investigate the
effects of competition in the procurement of weapon systems,
(2) define the types of competition and determine their
effect in the procurement process, (3) identify strategies
applicable to introducing competition into a weapon system
procurement, and (4) evaluate the former as they apply to the




In support of this study's research the following major
research question was posed: How might competitive
procurement methodologies be incorporated in the Advanced
Assault Amphibian Vehicle program's acquisition strategy?
To answer this question, the following subsidiary
questions were addressed:
1. What is the AAAV program's acquisition strategy at this
time?
2. What are the competitive procurement methodologies
which could be employed in the AAAV program?
3. What are the variables that must be considered in
evaluating, formulating and executing a competitive
procurement strategy?
4. If competitive procurement can be employed, what
method(s) will deliver the maximum benefits to the
program of lower price and higher quality?
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The information presented in this study was obtained from
(1) currently available procurement literature, and (2)
interviews with contracting personnel currently involved with
programs utilizing competitive procurement methodologies.
Literature references were obtained from material held at the
Naval Postgraduate School, the Defense Logistics Studies
Information Exchange (DLSIE), the Defense Technical
Information Center (DTIC), and the Department of Defense
(DOD) Directives and Instructions applicable to this study.
Interviews were conducted both via telephone and in person
and are identified in the references.
E. SCOPE OF STUDY
The scope of this study is in the form of a case study,
and ascertains the feasibility of competitive procurement of
the AAAV. This study addresses present methods of
competitive procurement and evaluates their applicability in
the AAAV program. In evaluating competitive procurement
methodologies other programs have been reviewed to determine
if the lessons learned from them can be applied to the AAAV
program.
F. LIMITATIONS
Though this study addresses lessons learned from other
programs, it will not attempt to critique the programs
implementation of a particular methodology. Rather it will
extrapolate similar circumstances and criteria from previous
efforts and attempt to apply a programs results in predicting
the most likely outcome if utilized in the AAAV program.
G. ASSUMPTIONS
It is assumed that the reader of this study has a
familiarity with the basic concepts and regulations
pertaining to systems acquisition.
H. ORGANIZATION OF THIS STUDY
Chapter II of this study presents an overview of the
nature of competition, discusses the types of competition,
the factors affecting the use of competition, and provides a
basis on which the study will build an analysis of the
possible effct of competition of the AAAV program. Chapter
III will introduce the dual sourcing methodologies and
presents the advantages and disadvantages of each method.
Chapter IV will focus on the effects of cometition on the
Automotive Commodities of which the AAAV is a member, and
presents a basis for evaluating the potential benefits of
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competition and the risks of foregoing competition. Chapter
V presents the current acquisition strategy of the AAAV
program and analyzes the strategy's use of competition
throughout the acquisition process. Chapter VI analyzes the
individual variables that must be considered in evaluating
the relevance of introducing production competition, and
analyzes the suitability of each dual sourcing method for use
by the program. Chapter VII presents a method for performing
an economic analysis of the effect of dual sourcing on
funding for the program. This method is then applied in
analyzing the recommended dual sourcing methodology and
possible economic projections are presented. Chapter VIII
presents recommendations and conclusions of the study.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF COMPETITION
A. INTRODUCTION
Increased competition in the acquisition of weapon
systems has been hailed by many as one possible solution to
the numerous and well publicized problems surrounding
Government procurements. Besides the well founded belief
that competition will result in lower prices, other benefits
include improved quality and reliability, technical
innovation in addressing new requirements, the expansion of
the industrial base, and the appearance of safeguarding the
public trust in the awarding of contracts and commitment of
public funds.
Congressional preference for competitive procurement
methods have been plainly expressed in both Public Law and
Department of Defense (DOD) Directives. These include:
1. Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984 (Public
Law 98-369). CICA strongly affirms that competition is
the standard acquisition method and that sole source
procurement is the exception.
2. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-109. Places
emphasis on the early stages of the acquisition process
allowing competitive exploration of alternative system
designs that will meet the mission need.
3. DOD Defense Appropriations Act of 1984 (Public Law 98-
212) states:
None of the funds made available by this Act
shall be used to initiate full-scale engineering
development of any major defense acquisition program
until the Secretary of Defense has provided to the
Committees on Appropriations of the House and Senate:
a. a certification that the system or subsystem
being developed will be procured in quantities that
are not sufficient to warrant development of two or
more production sources, or
b. a plan for the development of two or more sources
for the production of the system or subsystem is
being developed.
4. SECNAVINST 4210. 6A of 13 April 1988. Requires that:
The development of each project/program will begin
with a minimum of two contractors/contractor teams
performing concurrent but separate development up to
full-scale engineering development at which time it will
normally be narrowed to two contractors developing a
system to one design.
5. DOD Directive 5000.1 states:
That provisions for obtaining competition in each
phase of the acquisition process shall be described in
the acquisition strategy. This includes planning for
competition for ideas and technologies in the early
phases and the use of commercial style competition
procedures that emphasize quality and establish
performance as well as price during the production phase.
In summary, a program manager is required by law and
regulation to actively pursue competition to the greatest
extent possible during all phases of the acquisition process.
As will be shown the accomplishment of this goal will depend
largely on the decisions and evaluations performed early in
the acquisition planning process. Ground lost early in the
process may prove difficult or impossible to regain due to a
contractor's prohibitive pricing of technical data or the
previous elimination of possible competitors.
B. EFFECTS OF COMPETITION
In 1965, then Secretary of Defense McNamara testified to
the Joint Economics Committee of Congress that competitive
7
procurement of DOD systems could save the country 25% of the
total cost of a systems procurement [Ref. 3:p. 17]. Though
this figure lacked substantiation, an emphasis on competitive
research since that time has produced empirical evidence that
supports the claim that substantial savings may be realized
when competition is introduced into the procurement process.
The results of several such studies, conducted by the
Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), the Army Procurement
Research Office (APRO), and The Analytical Services
Corporation (TASC) are shown as Table 1 [Ref. 4:pp. 1-20, 1-
21]. The different figures, reflecting the computed amounts
of savings, are due to dissimilar research methodology and
structure. The savings reflect only recurring costs and not
the nonrecurring costs associated with gaining competition
(i.e. special tooling).
One interesting observation of the IDA-74 study was that
the original source won only one of the subsequent 17 winner-
take-all competitions. Two reasons put forward to explain
this fact are: [Ref. 5:pp. 48-49, 6:p. 20]
1. That the original source utilized manufacturing labor
over capital investment, even though this sacrificed
efficiency, since under the profit policy this strategy
would generate greater profits. This arrangement
caused the manufacturer to be trapped by his own
inefficiency.
2. That the original source felt that it could not greatly
reduce the offered price because it felt compelled to
support past pricing practices.
8
TABLE 1
ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE SAVINGS DUE TO COMPETITION
Equipment IDA-74 APRO-78 IDA-79 TASC-79
Electronics
FAAR Radar 16.6 16.6
FAAR TADDS 18.2 18.2
AN/ARC- 131 -2.1 -16.2
UPM-98 Test Set 3.0 11.5
TD-352 Multiplexer 57.8 58.0 55.6
TD-660 Multiplexer 30.2 38.3 28.4
60-6402 Elec. Cont 57.0 49.4 52.7
SPA 66 Radar Ind. -3.4
APX72 Airb. Transp 32.6 27.1 23.3







SPA-25 Radar Ind. 21.3 48.8 10.7
USM-181 Test Set 36.0 56.0 36.3
FGL-20 Teletype 32.0 23.7 39.9




Tow Missile 48. 1 8.5 8.9 12.3
Dragon Round 2.7 2.8
SHILLELAGH -0.2 5.9 -8.0 9.4
TALOS (G&C unit) 42.3 40.8 39.8
BULLPUP 12 (Martin) 13.9 31.7 26.5
BULLPUP 12 (Maxson) 45.8
SIDEWINDER AIM-9D/G -4.6 0.7
SIDEWINDER AIM-9B 1.6 -5.6
STD. MISSILE 66A -4.2 59.2
STD. MISSILE 67A 34.0
Equipment
HAWK Motor Parts 6.4 45.7 49.9
TOW Launcher 30.2 44.2 30.2
DRAGON Tracker 12.0 12.3
MK-48 Torpedo Wrhd. 53.2 48.6
MK-48 Elect. Ass. 37.5 47.0
MK-48 Exploder 61.8
Rockeye Bomb -23.0 -4.5
Source: Establishing Competiti ve Productive Sources
,
1984
C. PERFECT COMPETITION VS. EFFECTIVE COMPETITION
Economist have classified competition in the market place
into four categories: perfect competition, monopoly,
monopolistic competition, and oligopoly. The deciding
factors in each of these classifications are the number of
buyers and sellers in the market; a) perfect competition has
many buyers and sellers, b) monopoly has one seller and many
buyers, c) monopolistic competition (monopsony) has a single
buyer and many sellers, and d) oligopoly where a small number
of firms, sharing great interdependence, make up the market
with many buyers (i.e., oil industry). [Ref. 7:pp. 231-232 ]
For perfect competition to exist and exert pressure on
the market to produce efficiently (at the lowest possible
cost), four conditions must exist: [Ref. 7:p. 232]
1. There must be many buyers and sellers so that the
product of any one seller is the same as the product of
any other seller.
2. Each participant in the market, whether buyer or
seller, must be so small in relation to the entire
market, that it cannot effect the producers price.
3. That all resources be completely mobile and free to
move into and out of the market at will.
4. Consumers and sellers have perfect knowledge of the
relevant economic and technical data.
The configuration of the defense market is such that none
of the above criteria will be fully met for the vast majority
of items procured. Appendix A presents a comparison of the
differences faced by the buyer and seller between the defense
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market and the commercial market [Ref. 8
:
pp . 16-18]. With
the specialization of technology and defense contractors
carving out special niches in the market the program manager
faces a competitive category known as "bilateral monopoly".
This is a market characterized by a single buyer confronted
by a single seller (Sole Source Environment). In the
bilateral monopoly the Government finds itself as the only
buyer (monopsonist ) , and since most weapon systems are
sufficiently unique from others the seller finds itself in
the position of a monopoly. In this market the price that is
finally paid for an item is determined by the relative
bargaining strengths of the two parties and the skill of
their negotiators. [Refs. 5:p. 40, 7:p. 296]
The objective of the Government when confronted by a
bilateral monopoly is to introduce competition into the
market by locating or developing an additional source(s)
which will be able to compete effectively with the original
seller and thereby introduce competitive pressures into the
acquisition process. If successful, a market with two sellers
is established in which they compete for the buyer's market.
This type of market is called a "duopoly". The existence of
a duopoly leads to the concept of effective competition.
Effective competition is defined as "that as the result of
competition, the expected value of the benefits realized
exceeds the expected value of the costs." [Ref. 9:p. 21]
The goal of competitive procurement then i s to introduce
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effective competition into the market and to lower the
acquisition cost sufficiently to achieve at a minimum the
recovery of costs incurred by the Government in establishing
a second source. [Refs. 5:p. 40, 7:p. 334]
The existence of the duopoly, however, as has been
demonstrated in defense procurement does not in itself
guarantee that competition between the two sources will be
effective. It is accepted in the duopoly that both firms
will attempt to maximize their respective profits in relation
to other business/products that the firm manufactures. Each
firm also possesses a limited amount of resources which it
may utilize to make investments. If a firm concludes that it
can maximize its profits by manufacturing other nondefense
products and does not devote sufficient resources to compete
fully against its competitor in the defense market, it will
assume a follower role. In the duopoly then, four
possibilities exist for competitive interaction: [Ref. 5:p.
41]
1. Firm A decides to be the leader and Firm B follows.
2. Firm B decides to be the leader and Firm A follows.
3. Both firms desire to be the leader.
4. Neither firm desires to be the leader.
Only in the third example will true competition surface.
Since dual sourcing efforts require two manufacturers, it is
possible for a firm to utilize a price gaming strategy in
which it will satisfy itself with the award of the sustaining
12
rate portion of production at a price designed to maximize
its total corporate profits. This gaming guarantees the
losing source a prescribed production quantity at its price,
and allows the firm to maximize total corporate profits but
without introducing substantial competitive pressure on
price. This price gaming is one factor that makes the
accurate forecasting of savings due to competition difficult;
because no one can tell, if or when, price gaming may enter
the market. [Ref. 7:p. 335]
D. DESIGN VS. PRODUCTION COMPETITION
In the process of awarding a contract, a program manager
is concerned with two types of competition, Design/Technical
and Production/Price.
1. Design/Technical Competition
Design competition is defined in DFAR 4.6-16(B) as:
Design or technical competition is present when two
or more qualified sources of supply are invited to submit
design or technical proposals, with the subsequent
contract award based primarily on this factor, rather
than on a price basis.
The primary goal of design competition is to identify and
develop different conceptual/technical approaches that
fulfill an identified mission need while falling within an
affordable price range. This competition occurs
predominantly during the preliminary phases of the
acquisition process. The scenario for this competition is
generally in line with the award of multiple (three or more)
contracts during the Concept Exploration (CE) Phase, leading
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to a down selection to multiple (two or more) contracts in
the Demonstration and Validation (D&V) Phase, and finally to
the award of a contract to one or two finalists entering into
Full Scale Development (FSD) with a single design. Figure 1
demonstrates the above description of design competition


















Figure 1. General Format of Design Competition
Source: Establishing Competitive P roduction Sources , 1984.
2. Production/Price Competition
Production competition may take place during FSD but
occurs predominantly during the production phase of
the acquisition process. DFAR 4.6-16(d) defines
production/price competition as:
A contract shall be reported as "price competition"
if offers were solicited and received from at least two
responsible offerors capable of satisfying the
Government's requirements wholly or partially, and the
awards or awards were made to the offeror or offerors
submitting the lowest evaluated prices.
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The goal of production competition is to procure the
system at a "fair and reasonable price", to continue to
encourage quality and technical improvements, and to expand
the industrial base for use in the event of full mobilization
or surge requirements. In contrast to design competition,
which was concerned with projecting a realistic price,
production competition is concerned with ensuring a fair and
reasonable price. During production, however, the
contractor's primary concern is with the profit earned from
making the weapon system. It is during production in the sole
source environment that the Government may see the cost of a
system rising and find that it has little or no leverage to
inhibit cost escalation. Production competition has been
found to be the most effective method the Government
possesses for ensuring that the price paid for the system is
fair and reasonable. [Ref. 4:p. 1-15]
3. Carry Over Theory of Competition
The design and production competition processes are
separate, unique components of the acquisition cycle. Some
researchers have suggested that intense design competition
will subsequently lead to effective production competition.
This hypothesis, know as the "carry-over theory" has little
support in practice [Ref. 9:pp. 19-20]. During design
competition contractors are primarily concerned with
maintaining a viable competitive position, and hopefully
winning the eventual production contract and securing the
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profits from this effort. Though design and technological
factors and not price are assumed to be the key concern in
design competition, both the contractor and program manager
are aware that a smaller price tag is an inducement for a
concept to be carried forward into the next acquisition
phase. This inducement has caused many contractors to be
overly optimistic in their price forecasting and can lead to
price increases once in production. This hypothesis has also
been found to be true when only one concept is carried
forward to FSD and development price estimates grow as
unforseen and unanticipated changes or problems are
encountered [Ref. 4:p. 1-10]. [Ref. 9:p. 16]
The absence of competition in future acquisition
phases then tends to increase the "buy-in" efforts of
contractors. This bidding strategy is based on the belief
that the contractor will have ample opportunities to "get
well" during later sole source acquisition phases. In
addition program managers, who naturally have a strong
interest/attachment for the program and are program
advocates, are induced not to vigorously challenge cost
projections during design competition. If a single contract
is carried forward to FSD and technical problems occur, the
Government has lost the leverage it possessed in a
competitive environment and may find contract costs rising
excessively. Also the "winner-take-all" position typically
present when awarding a single contract entering FSD,
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pressures the contractor to be very optimistic since this may
be the end of the line with the resultant loss of production
opportunities. [Ref. 10:p. 19]
E. FACTORS AFFECTING PRODUCTION COMPETITION
The decision to dual source a system and introduce a new
production source is often a complex economic, technical and
management decision. As previously mentioned, this decision
is practiced generally when the sum of the total recurring
cost savings is greater than the sum of the nonrecurring
costs needed to establish the second source. The decision to
introduce a second source when the above criterion is not
valid is usually attributed to political, socioeconomic, or
other factors.
1 . Economic Variables
a. Quantity to be Procured
A general rule is that the larger the quantity
procured, the greater the potential for production
competition [Ref. 4:p. 3-1]. A larger production quantity
allows for a smaller allotment of nonrecurring costs to each
item produced (amortization), allows a smaller savings margin
from a flatter progress curve to accumulate to recover the
costs of establishing the second source, and increases the




Producers are generally attracted to more
lengthy, stable programs because they offer an attractive
market with fewer problems and less possibility of program
cancellation. Generally the longer the production duration,
the more favorable the outlook for competition. [Ref. 11 :p.
107]
c. Special Tooling and Special Test Equipment
The establishment of a second source for
production may largely depend on the amount of this single
factor. Given the unique characteristics of defense systems
a manufacturer may require large investments in special
tooling and special test equipment that is unique to a
specific type of production effort. These costs will have to
be amortized over the quantities produced, and generally
represent the major nonrecurring cost of establishing the
second source. It has been observed that these requirements
vary considerably from commodity to commodity. [Ref. 4:p. 3-
3]
d. Learning Curve
Also known as the Price Improvement Curve (PIC)
or Progress Curve, this concept develops a relationship where
the price of the Xth. unit produced will be reduced by a
demonstrated percentage as the number of units produced
doubles. Where a 95% learning curve is relevant, the cost of
the second unit would be 95% of the first, the fourth unit
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would be 95% of the second, the eighth unit would be 95% of
the fourth, and so on. Generally the more shallow the
learning curve, i.e., 95%, the greater the potential for
savings from the shift and rotation of the learning curve.
If a steep curve is present, i.e., 75%, the original producer
may have moved substantially down the learning curve and
reached a point where the second source would not be able to
compete effectively due to the significant learning
experienced by the original source. [Ref. 4:p. 3-3]
The anticipated savings from production
competition result from an observed shift and rotation of the
progress curve once competition is introduced, or once the
threat of competition is considered viable by the first
source. Figure 2 demonstrates the concept of the shift and
rotation of the progress curve. Initially, a shift in the
progress curve is experienced due to the introduction of
competition and delivers immediate savings, secondly, a
rotation/steepening of the progress curve delivers an
increased level of learning and subsequent savings as
competition continues into future years as the competitors
vie for production awards. The savings that result from
production competition are the difference between the
anticipated cost of the program following the original
progress curve, minus the projected cost of production
considering the expected shift and rotation of the progress

























Figure 2. Projected Savings from the Shift and Rotation
of the Learning Curve
Source: Developed by the Researcher
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The concept of the shift and rotation of the
progress curve can be better appreciated and analyzed in
Figure 3 which presents the recorded effects of competition
on the acquisition of the Tomahawk Cruise Missile. In the
case of the Tomahawk, General Dynamics (GD) as the sole
source demonstrated a 93% progress curve during the initial
four years of production. After the completion of the
technology transfer with Raytheon as the second source, GD
offered price reductions for the missile which represented a
35% shift, and a 2% rotation of the progress curve from 93%
to 91%. Even before competition was introduced, GD offered
price reductions for the missile as shown in their offer for
a multiyear contract. As shown in Figure 4 competition in
the procurement of the missile is expected to generate total
savings of $768 million with procurement of 100% of the
planned buy. If competition had not been introduced,
projections indicate that insufficient funds were available
in the budget to procure all the rounds desired by the Navy.
[Ref. 12]
e. Contractor Capacity
This variable is concerned with production rate.
The production rate of a commodity is the level/rate at which
an item is produced over a given time span, i.e., 100 units
per month. If the rate at which the system is to be procured
exceeds the production capacity of the sole source, then
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Figure 3. Effect of Competition on Pricing of the TOMAHAWK
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Figure 4. Projected Savings from the Competitive
Procurement of the TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile
Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
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the original source or a competitive source. The decision to
compete a system is generally simpler when capacity is
insufficient for the contract. [Ref. 9:p. 55]
The presence of excess contractor capacity may
affect the competitive decision in two ways. First, if
excess capacity is present the loss of production due to
splitting awards may increase overhead rates on each unit.
This would raise the price of units produced from the
original source. Second, the impact on production rate is
directly related with the concepts of "economy/diseconomy of
scale" and the "law of diminishing returns" [Ref. 7:p. 198].
The concept of economy of scale states that production costs
for an item when graphed are generally "U" shaped (Figure 5),
with the minimum cost associated with point "E", the maximum
cost at points "1" and "2E-1", with the minimum and maximum
production rates at "1" and "2E-1" respectively [Ref. 7:pp.
226-227]. The production rate cost curve demonstrates that
the costs associated with the production of an item may
decline or increase depending on the original position of the
manufacturer on the curve.
The production rate cost curve is "U" shaped
because the first unit produced must bear the full burden of
all fixed costs of production with subsequent units
incrementally reducing that burden until achieving the most
efficient level of production (Point E). Further investments
of capital, labor, or material will increase production but
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Figure 5. Production Rate cost Curve
Source: Microeconomics: Theory and Applications , 1985.
at a diminishing marginal return for investment beyond point
"E" due to the Law of Diminishing Returns which states that:
[Ref. 7:p. 159]
If equal increments of an input are added, the quantities
of other inputs held constant, the resulting increments of
product will decrease beyond some point, the marginal product
of the input will diminish.
Some of the added cost that may cause this decrease in
marginal product return beyond Point E include overtime for
workers and increased maintenance for machinery.
The situation could present itself where the
contractor has sufficient capacity for the proposed contract
increase, but be operating at a point on the curve such that
the contract would require production at rates well above the
efficient use of capacity. In this case it could prove more




The Government's right to technical data
pertaining to the design of the actual item and the
manufacturing processes involved has the potential of being a
major obstacle to second sourcing. If the Government fails
to procure unlimited rights to patent/proprietary data a
second source may not be feasible technically or financially.
The rights to utilize all necessary data should be negotiated
early in the procurement process. It may prove impractical
to procure these rights at a later time when the contractor
can be expected to prohibitively price these rights in an
effort to prevent competition.
The importance of this variable was well
demonstrated on the second sourcing of the cruise missile
engine. When the second sourcing effort began, the developer
originally claimed 100% of the parts as proprietary data
which necessitated the use of a Directed Licensing approach.
This required the payment of royalties for use of the data by
the second source to the developer which resulted in
additional cost to the Government. Due to the urgency of the
contract, the Government was not able to verify the claim.
After several years of legal clarification and investigation
the developer now only claims rights to six parts. This




The technical complexity of a system may dictate
the use of more elaborate and expensive data transfer
methods, i.e., Leader-Follower, and may make infeasible the
implementation of a Technical Data Package (TDP) strategy due
to the difficulty in preparing the TDP. [Ref. 4:p. 3-4]
c. State-of-the-Art
A state-of-the-art system may proof difficult to
compete. These systems have a higher rate of change than
mature systems which increases the difficulty of acquiring a
useful TDP. This variable may also dictate the use of face-
to-face contractor assistance to effect technology transfer.
[Ref. 4:p. 3-5]
d. Other Applications
If the system has commercial potential the
likelihood for competition is increased [Ref. 4:p. 3-5].
This reflects the increased size of the potential market and
the ability to sell to customers outside the Government
market. Even if the system itself is not suitable for
commercial marketing, the use of production processes that
can be applied to other commercial endeavors increases the
possibility of competition.
e. Privately Funded Research and Development
The development of modern weapon systems often
entails a combination of Government and private funding. The
rights to data acquired through private development belong to
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the developer and may not be used without compensation or
permission. The presence of proprietary data may prohibit or
impede competition. [Ref. 4:p. 3-5]
3. Program Variables
a. Maintenance Requirements
The second sourcing of a system may entail
fielding two systems that perform identically, but do not use
the same maintenance parts or procedures. As part of the
second sourcing decision the maintenance philosophy of the
system must be reviewed to ensure that supportability of the
system is not jeopardized. [Ref. ll:p. 108]
b. Production Lead Times
The existence of long production lead times for
critical components may delay production competition even
though a second source is qualified, because the second
source cannot acquire components needed for production [Ref.
4:p. 3-6]. This delay may make competition less attractive
or impossible. Typical lead times for such components as
aluminum forgings and aircraft landing gears, which may both
require up to 120 weeks, indicate the potential of such




If large amounts of subsystems are subcontracted
competition may not deliver its full benefits for two
reasons. First, the prime contractor ( s) would not have
direct control over the costs of production; and secondly,
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for certain critical/specialty systems the two production
sources could find themselves in competition for the limited
quantity available. This would require them to bid for the
subsystem and result in higher prices. Since it is unlikely
that the market could react quickly enough to overcome this
situation it would reduce the benefits expected from second
sourcing. [Ref. 4:p. 3-6]
d. Contract Complexity
The more complex the original contract is, the
greater difficulty in establishing competition. The
existence of warranties, the use of complex cost type
contracts, award fees, and other incentives may not be
compatible with provisions required for establishing the
second source. [Ref. 4:p. 3-6]
F. THE THREAT OF COMPETITION
In negotiating or performing a contract with a sole
source the program manager may decide to use the threat of
possible competition in future contracts as leverage in
gaining favorable concessions from the contractor. The
concessions gained utilizing this strategy are directly
related to whether the contractor considers the threat
genuine [Ref. 6:p. 25]. In negotiating, one is dealing in
the realm of uncertainties and "what ifs". In this
circumstance the program manager is using the power to
introduce competition into the acquisition process as
leverage. Also in negotiating all power/leverage is
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relative; this means that the way the contractor perceives
the threat, viable or unlikely, determines the reaction that
can be expected. An example will demonstrate this concept.
In the case of Amron Inc., the contractor had been making
the M103 brass cartridge for several years under a sole
source contract. Then in 1978, after the Government's
repeated inability to gain price concessions from Amron, the
company lost a winner-take-all competition to National
Eastern Corporation. Immediately Amron offered a significant
price reduction on a production option under the present
contract, a 27.7% reduction in price from 60.72 cents to
43.93 cents per cartridge. [Ref. 6:p. 25]
Figure 6 will assist in explaining how the threat of
competition can influence the pricing strategy a firm might
employ. The vertical line (d) represents the point at which
competition is expected to be introduced into the procurement
and demonstrates the shift and rotation of the learning curve
as theorized in a competitive model. Line (b) reflects the
competitive price in the market and is viewed as "fair and
reasonable" for the effort and risk. In the absence of
competition a firm can be expected to price the contract
between lines (a) and (b) . This illustrates a "skimming" or
a profit maximizing pricing strategy. This pricing reflects
a lack of competition in the market and as shown is priced
above the line reflecting a competitive price. If
competition is viewed as a certainty a firm may price a
30
Figure 6. Effect of the Threat of Competition on Pricing
Strategy
Source: Evaluation of Models and Techniques for
Estimating the Effects of Competition
, 1986.
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contract between lines (b) and (c). This illustrates a
"penetration" pricing strategy and may be employed to
discourage competitors from entering the market. The result
though is that the threat of competition, if viewed as
genuine by a contractor, can influence the attitude and
manner in which he prices/bids a contract. [Ref. 6:p. 24]
G. TYPES OF PRODUCTION COMPETITION
1. Split Buy/Sustaining Rate Awards
The term "split buy/sustaining rate" award refers to
a guarantee by the Government to a contractor, involved in
the dual sourcing of a system, that if its bid for the
contract is not accepted as the lowest/prime source it will
nevertheless be awarded a contract for a smaller sustaining
portion of production. This sustaining portion is generally
established as a percentage of the quantity to be produced,
i.e., 25%, during the current contract. This award results
from the decision of the Government to maintain dual sources
in future production to keep open the prospect of
competition. Due to the unique characteristics of DOD weapon
systems, it is inconceivable that a firm would choose to
maintain a production capability and bear the added expense
when no market exists for its product. The sustaining award
provides a market for the minimum production quantity
sufficient to maintain the second source. [Ref. 4:p. 14-2]
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2. Winner-Take-All Award
As the name implies the "Winner-Take-All" award of a
contract assigns to the winning contractor the full
production quantity of the contract. It has been observed
that this type of award increases the projected cost savings
of the contract by eliciting a reduced price for the effort.
Several reasons seem plausible and support this observation:
[Ref. 6:p. 25]
1. Winner-Take-All does not sacrifice economy of scale the
way dual sourcing must.
2. The splitting of a production quantity between two
sources reduces the learning effect that eventually
results in potential savings.
3. There is no second place or tomorrow in winner-take-all
awards.
4. Due to the unique characteristics of weapon systems and
the costs of keeping facilities idle, it is doubtful
that a contractor will be available or capable of
production in the future once a contract is lost. This
fact necessitates a true "best and final offer" to
attempt to secure the contract. The exception to this
point are those items for which a commercial market
exists
.
Figure 7 displays the estimated savings by
competition type as reported by TASC 79. [Ref. 6:p. 16]
H. SUMMARY
This chapter introduced the concept of competition and
presented research that substantiated the claim that a
competitive environment could reduce the acquisition cost of
weapon systems. In discussing competition, this chapter also
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differentiated between the concepts of effective competition
and perfect competition, and discussed the variables that may
have an impact on the decision to introduce competition.
Also the differences between design and production
competition were introduced and an appreciatiion of the








































Figure 7. Production Award Method Savings Comparision
Source: Evaluation of Models and Techniques for Estimating
the Effects of Competition , 1986.
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III. AN INTRODUCTION TO SECOND SOURCING
A. GOALS OF SECOND SOURCING
A basic management tenet is that a business/program must
establish goals and work towards these goals to succeed in
its mission/purpose. The two basic goals of a second
sourcing effort are: [Ref. 2:p. 22]
1. To control or reduce the cost/price of an item.
2. The maintenance of an adequate industrial base.
In addition several other collateral goals may be
realized that benefit the program and the country: [Refs.
2:p. 22, 13:p. 5-3]
1. Improved mobilization capability.
2. Promote geographic dispersion of industry so as to
preclude destruction of an only source due to natural
disaster or enemy/terrorist attack and qualify new
sources who possess specialized technologies.
3
.
Smooth out fluctuations in production for individual
firms caused by sole source awards.
4. Needed Government controls are lessened due to the
presence of competition.
5. Increase technical performance by increasing technical
or design competition.
6. More fully meet socioeconomic goals by increasing
awards to minority and small/disadvantaged businesses.
7. Increase ability to meet commitments of co-production
agreements for NATO programs.
8. Obtain a higher quality product.
9. Encourage the incumbent to be more receptive to the
concerns of the buyer and to address criticisms.
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The advantages presented clearly show the potential
benefits of second sourcing. Each factor should be
considered during the economic analysis of the second
sourcing decision and given the weight that each may warrant
under the existing situation.
B. TECHNICAL DATA RIGHTS
Before discussing the methodologies utilized in
implementing the second sourcing of a system it is important
to understand the concept of technical data rights. The
determination of the Government's right to data is perhaps
the single determining factor in deciding on the methodology
employed in second sourcing. There are two basic types of
data rights: [Ref. 13:p. 5-18]
1. Unlimited Rights. The right to use, duplicate, or
disclose technical data in whole or in part in any
manner and for any purpose whatsoever, and to direct or
permit others to do so.
2. Limited Rights. The right of the Government, or others
on behalf of the Government, to use duplicate, or
disclose data, but not outside the Government without
written permission.
FAR 27.406.d(4) states that it is the general policy of
the Government to acquire data with unlimited rights when the
data resulted from work on a Government contract. When the
data is developed in independent research and development
efforts conducted by a contractor the data and its use are
controlled by the contractor. Contractors consider such data
proprietary and have shown a historic tendency to restrict
its use to maintain market share or competitive edge.
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A new type of technical data right called "Government
Purpose License Rights (GPLR), is just now being introduced
during the writing of this study. This new classification of
data rights has as its goal the clarification of the
authorized use of technical data, when the data resulted from
work funded by both the Government and the contractor. This
new concept became effective in DOD FAR Supplement Subpart
227.471 on 4 April 1988 and is defined as:
Rights to use, duplicate, or disclose data, in whole or
in part and in any manner, for Government purposes only,
and to permit others to do so for Government purposes only.
Government purposes include competitive procurement, but do
not include the right to have or permit others to use
technical data for commercial purposes.
The adoption of the GPLR concept will protect the legitimate
rights of Government contractors to technical data, which
could be used by competitors in commericial markets. This is
accomplished while simultaneously allowing the Government to
use the technical data to introduce competitive pressure into
the defense market, by transferring the data to other
potential contractors, without the timely and costly delays
associated with challenging data rights.
When introducing a second source, determining the
Government's rights pertaining to the use of data is a
mandatory step in the decision process. Since most data are
Department of Defense unique and developed in whole or in
part at Government expense, the Government maintains
unlimited rights. In cases where data are proprietary, the
Government evaluates the program implications of buying the
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rights, or in arranging to use the rights in a limited manner
if the contractor refuses to sell them. Practice has shown
that data rights can be easily negotiated during design
competition when competitive pressure assists the Government
in negotiating a reasonable price for the data. The DFAR
(27 . 403-2 ( f) ) lists the conditions when the Government may
negotiate for unlimited rights in proprietary data:
1. There is a clear need for reprocurement of the item.
2. There are no suitable alternative items or processes.
3. The item can be manufactured by a competent
manufacturer without the need for additional data that
cannot be reasonably purchased.
4. Savings in reprocurement using the purchased data will
exceed the data cost and rights-therein.
C. SECOND SOURCING METHODOLOGIES
Once the decision to second source a system is made, the
program manager must decide on how to bring this effort to a
successful completion. This process is a complicated
managerial and technical effort requiring high skill,
coordination, and supervision. Practice has identified five
strategies or methodologies currently used to accomplish the
second sourcing effort. These methodologies are Form, Fit
and Function; Technical Data Package; Leader-Follower; Direct
Licensing; and Contractor Teaming. [Ref. ll:p. 22]
1. Form, Fit, and Function (F3)
The F3 method of second sourcing depends on a second
source designing an acceptable alternative system that meets
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established performance specifications (speed, accuracy, or a
specified ability) and physical specifications (size, weight,
length). F3 lends itself most readily to simple components
such as ammunition, but has been successfully introduced in
very complex and expensive systems such as the Air Force's
Alternate Fighter Engine Program [Ref. 10:p. 96]. Where the
system is a subsystem of another major end item, the F3
method prescribes that the system must meet all interface and
mounting requirements.
The advantages and disadvantages of the F3 strategy
are: [Ref. 9:p. 40]
Advantages
1. Increased competition can be expected since a variety
of production and design methods may be applicable to
the requirement.
2. The F3 design/performance criteria encourages
innovation and ingenuity in meeting the need. Since
contractors are not unduly constrained by Government
designs and production requirements new approaches to
old problems arise utilizing ingenious new production
or system technology delivering a superior product.
3. This strategy can be implemented without procurement of
costly technical data, and the Government is relieved
of the "Implied Warranty Doctrine" where the Government
may be held liable for a contractor's nonperformance
due to defective specifications.
4. The Government may be relieved of maintaining a
technical data package which increases the trouble and
cost of a system.
5. No transfer of technology or data is required between




1. The primary limitation of the F3 strategy is the
logistical/maintenance philosophy associated with the
system. Each item has a designated maintenance level
at which repair is authorized. This system may produce
items that are not suited for repair at lower echelons
and would greatly increase the cost of maintaining
spare parts inventories and training repair personnel.
2. The Government must pay for a second design effort.
2. Technical Data Package (TDP)
The TDP is a technical description of an end item and
may contain technical drawings, plans, specifications,
industrial standards, performance requirements, parts and
associated lists, quality assurance and packaging data for
the item. [Refs. 4: 10-4, 14:p. 34]
In this second sourcing method a contractor is
contracted to build an identical end item from a Government
provided TDP. Technology transfer is achieved strictly on
the basis of the TDP with no contractor-to-contractor
exchange. This means that the TDP is the one critical
document in the procurement process. Since so much depends
on the TDP package, plans must be incorporated early in the
acquisition cycle to develop and test the package.
TDP ' s are maintained in three levels. The first two
levels, Level I and Level II, contain those engineering
drawings developed during the CE, D&V, and FSD Phases. These
levels are appropriate for manufacturing production
prototypes for field testing and logistical support research.
A difficulty with these drawings are that they usually
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contain contractor unique legends which may refer to
proprietary data or processes unknown to the second source.
[Ref. 14:p. 36]
The Level III TDP is that document which by
definition: [Ref. 14:p. 37]
Allows a competent manufacturer to produce and
maintain quality control of an item interchangeable with
those of the original design without resorting to
additional production design effort, data, or recourse to
the original design activity.
The Level III TDP is contracted for as a deliverable item in
the contract and must be planned for and validated prior to
use. Failure to validate the TDP may lead to subsequent
claims by the second source al.leging defective specifications
should he encounter problems during manufacturing. TDP
validation is the process where the Government solely, or
through a joint Industry-Government team, ensures that the
package is accurate, current, complete and clear. This
process is lengthy and complicated and will most likely
require support outside of the program manager's office. The
process entails methodical culling of the data to ensure that
only relevant data are present, obsolete data are removed or
updated, and that all engineering changes are present. Once
validated, the TDP can be sent to the second source for
manufacturing to begin. [Ref. 4:p. 10-9]
In providing the TDP, the Government assumes
responsibility for appropriateness and completeness. History
has shown that despite the best efforts of all concerned, the
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majority of TDP ' s are insufficient in one area or another.
This is primarily because the simple transfer of engineering
drawings does not impart the same level of expertise,
knowledge or familiarity as does actual development and
manufacturing experience. This "know-how" is an intangible
which cannot be put down on paper and is the factor most
troublesome in implementing the technology transfer. The
General Accounting Office reported the following: [Ref.
15:p. 21]
For manufacturing some advanced hardware, there can
never be enough data, it seems, to achieve effective
transfer of the technology. The critical factors may be
craftsman's skills, ingenious processes, "tricks of the
trades", and esoteric shop practices which cannot be
reduced to formal, indeed informal paper.
To overcome this difficulty, the Government may
decide to transition a second source to full production by
utilizing an "Educational Buy". The purpose of this
procedure is to certify the ability and quality of the second
source's manufacturing system, and simultaneously gauge the
accuracy and completeness of the TDP. This is accomplished
by contracting with the second source to produce a limited,
but sufficient number of items to substantiate the TDP along
with the manufacturer's ability to perform the required work.
Once all problems are corrected the second source is
qualified and competes against the original source for future
production contracts. [Ref. ll:p. 50]
The advantages and disadvantages of the TDP strategy
are: [Refs. 4:p. 2-6, 9
:
pp . 44-45, 16:p. 35]
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Advantages
1. Provides for the most flexible competition by allowing
for multiple sources, and for spares procurement in the
out years of the contract.
2. Allows for maximum Government configuration control.
3. In-house Government technical expertise is developed
during validation.
4. Fully supports the maintenance philosophy of the
program by fielding only one variant of system.
5. Most flexible method of competition.
Disadvantages
1. Requires moderate to significant Government facilities
and manpower to effect validation.
2. Production competition is not usually achievable until
the third year of production when a baseline system has
been established.
3. Government accepts responsibility for defects in the
TDP.
3. Leader-Follower (LF)
The Leader-Follower (LF) strategy is defined in FAR
17.401 as:
Leader company procurement is an extraordinary
procurement technique under which the developer or sole
source producer of an item or system (the leader company)
furnishes manufacturing assistance and know-how or
otherwise enables a follower company to become a source
of supply for the item or system.
LF is used when the design or complexity of a system is such
that a second source would be unable to manufacture the
system without the aid and benefit of the original developer
[Ref. 4: 11-1]. The most crucial issue with the L/F strategy
as with the TDP strategy is the determination of technical
data rights. This strategy parallels the TDP strategy in all
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regards, except that the complexity of the system is such to
require the manufacturing "know-how" of the developer to
teach the second source the production process. If it is
determined that proprietary data are involved with the
process it may prove difficult for the Government to gain the
developer's cooperation. Past practice has shown that the
developer will price this data at a rate equal to the
expected loss of business at the time of introduction of a
second source. If the data has commercial applications the
developer may be unwilling to divulge the data at any price.
[Ref. 2:p. 36]
If it is determined practical to implement a LF
strategy, the Government has three options to pursue by
awarding a contract to the: (FAR 17.402(a))
1. Leader company, obligating it to subcontract a
designated portion of the required end items to a
specified follower company and to assist it to produce
the required end items.
2. Leader company, for the required assistance to a
follower company, and a prime contract to the follower
for production of the end items.
3. Follower company, obligating it to subcontract with a
designated leader for the required assistance.
FAR Part 17 also requires the Government to maintain
the right to approve the follower source. Though several
methods of follower selection exist and are designed to
maximize particular production requirements, this right
primarily protects the Government from having the leader
choose a source either totally incapable of performance or
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one that would require excessive effort to develop fully.
[Ref. 9:p. 43]
The advantages and disadvantages of the LF strategy
are: [Ref. 16:p. 34]
Advantages
1. Minimizes redundant hardware/software/firmware design
developments
.
2. Potentially overcomes data/data rights issues with
Leader.
3. Utilizes unique Leader capabilities.
4. Allows Government contractual alternatives in dealing
with the Leader/Follower.
5. Minimizes the Government's burden associated with
technology transfer.
Di sadvantages
1. If proprietary/patented data and techniques are
involved, strategy resembles Directed Licensing.
2
.
The cost of motivating or incentivizing the Leader to
participate
.
3. Potential for complex contractual relationships between
parties; Government may have to mediate conflicts.
4. Production competition usually not attainable until the
third year of production.
5. Complex environment to maintain Government
configuration contol.
4. Directed Licensing (DL)
The Directed Licensing (DL) strategy is a method
closely related to the Leader-Follower strategy. The major
distinction between the strategies is that the leader company
has possession and rights to proprietary data and the
follower pays a royalty fee for permission to use the patents
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or processes owned by the leader. DL in its purest form
seeks to solve both the issue of technology transfer and data
rights simultaneously. This is accomplished by the
Government paying for the right to use technical data and
through the face-to-face contractor exchange of information
and manufacturing "know-how". This added expense though will
raise the cost of the system and should only be used when the
Government is unable to procure unlimited data rights, in
which case the TDP or L/F strategy is utilized. Since DL
rarely, if ever, reduces program costs it is used primarily
as a method of establishing a production/mobilization base or
in pursuing second sourcing goals other than cost reduction.
[Ref. 17:p. 4]
The advantages and disadvantages of the DL strategy
are: [Ref. 9:pp. 47-48]
Advantages
1. The potential for production competition is maintained
throughout the acquisition cycle.
2. The Government need not become closely involved with
the actual transfer of technology between sources.
3. Quantity production decisions and source of supply
decisions can be postponed until later in the
acquisition process.
4. The designer is provided with protection as to how, or
in what markets, the second source is to be licensed to
sell the product; and, the designer may be compensated
for each item produced by the second source.




1. The existence of royalty and technical assistance fees
increase the cost of the acquisition and could be
prohibitive
.
2. It may be difficult to achieve the necessary degree of
cooperation between alternative production sources, and
the licensee may have little recourse against half-
hearted cooperation on the part of the licensor.
3. Some contractors may bid on projects simply to obtain
proprietary information on other producers' designs.
4. It may become difficult to maintain accountability.
5. Contractor Teaming (CT)
Contractor Teaming is a strategy where two or more
companies with similar research, development, and production
capabilities join together to form a contract team. The
teaming can be accomplished during either the CE or D&V
phases, but must be done at the very latest upon entering the
FSD phase. Once formed, the team competes in the development
of the system against other contractors or contractor teams
sharing all technical data that is gained from their co-
development effort [Ref. 18:p. 31]. Since both contractors
transfer technology through the development effort, both
contractors are qualified concurrently. At the completion of
the FSD the contract team may be split and will compete
against each other for production contracts.
A CT arrangement can be implemented contractually in
two ways: [Ref. 4:p. 13-2]
1. A prime contract awarded to one of the team members
would specify the requirement to award a subcontract to
a team member.
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2. The team members could form a separate, joint venture,
to which the Government would award a prime contract.
When considering soliciting for the formation of a
contract team several factors must be considered in judging
this methods applicability: [Ref. 18:p. 34]
1. The existence of a sufficient number of capable
contractors in the industrial base, each with similar
capabilities
.
2. Contractor motivation to enter into contractor teaming
arrangements.
3. Identification and implementation of a CT strategy into
the program acquisition strategy early on in the
acquisition cycle.
The advantages and disadvantages with the CT strategy
are: [Refs. 9:p. 51, ll:p. 72, 16:p. 33, 18:p. 36, 19:pp.
37-38]
Advantages
1. Second sources are developed as part of the development
process. This eliminates the problem of qualifying a
second source since both contractors were involved with
the design and possibly initial production/prototype
efforts
.
2. Technical success is enhanced by the efforts of two
contractors forming a design team.
3. Government liability for technical data is limited.
4. Competitive production is achieved much earlier than
under other methods of dual sourcing, possibly with the
first production lot, lowering unit production costs
due to maintenance of competition in the production
phase of the acquisition.
5. Cost free sharing of technology between the co-
developers .
6. Built-in price competition during the life of the
design competition with the possibility of production
competition.
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7. High level of fleet/combat readiness through higher




1. Possibly lengthening the source selection process.
2. Increasing source selection costs since two contractors
are involved with each proposal.
3. Increases configuration control efforts by the
Government once production has begun.
4. Original partitioning of responsibilities must be
overcome if independent competition is to occur
quickly.
5. As the splitting of the team approaches, the Government
may find difficulty in ensuring full and open transfer
of technology between the team members.
6. May prove difficult to maintain production competition
if team becomes significantly unbalanced in financial
resources/health, facilities or technical capability.
Now that the reader has a knowledge of the CT
strategy, the question might arise as to what would motivate
normally adversarial contractors to be willing to form joint
development teams. One reason appears to be the reduction in
research and development costs borne by each member. Also
the complexity of modern weapon systems may mandate that
without the knowledge of two or more leading developers in
the field, the system would not be completed or would require
excessive time and effort. Such is the case with the Air
Force's ATF (Advanced Tactical Fighter) and the Joint Service
V-22 "Osprey" (Tilt Rotor Aircraft). If mandated by the
Government as a requirement to compete for the contract, a
firm may find that this program will probably be the "only
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game in town" [Ref. 18:p. 53]. The Air Force will not
develop a new fighter for the 21st. century on a regular
basis, nor will the opportunity to learn from the development
effort be available either. Failure of the contractor to
participate in the competition in accordance with the
Government's requirements may preclude the contractor from
competition in the DOD market for a particular system for
many years. Such a resulting loss may prove catastrophic to
a defense contractor. In the case of CT, the Government is
taking full advantage of its position as a monopsony to model
a market place that fits its desire for an effective
competitive market.
D. THE SECOND SOURCE METHOD SELECTION MODEL
In evaluating the five dual sourcing methodologies
previously presented, the use of the Second Source Method
Selection Model (SSMSM) provides the program manager a
practical tool with which to judge the attractiveness of each
method. The model divides program variables into three
categories: economic, technical, and program management.
Each program variable is then evaluated on a five point
system to rank the effectiveness/suitability of the proposed
method. [Ref. 4:p. 3-7]
* for a particularly preferred method




x for a particularly inappropriate method
It is important to understand that variable ratings are
not additive. Any single overriding negative rating on a
variable could cancel the effectiveness of a particular
method, while an overriding positive factor could be
justification to pursue a particular method. The model's
value is not that it is a deterministic model, but rather
that it presents program variables in an orderly and logical
manner in which the program manager can conduct a comparison
of the influence that each variable may have as it relates to
the second sourcing decision. Table II presents the SSMSM.
[Ref 4:p. 3-8]
E. SUMMARY
This chapter presented the five second sourcing
methodologies used to develop and introduce competition into
the production phase of the acquisition process. It also
presented the Second Sourcing Method Selection Model (SSMSM)
as a means of evaluating the relative merits of each second
sourcing method. This evaluation is based on an analysis of
the unique economic, technical, and management variables of a
program. The SSMSM provides a convenient and ordered
technique of determining which second sourcing methods should
be analyzed further for possible use by the program.
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TABLE II
SECOND SOURCE METHOD SELECTION MODEL
Decision Form Technical Licensing Leader Contractor




High + + + + +
Medium + + +
Low - -
Duration
Long + + + + +
Medium + + + +
Short X X
Tooling Cos t
High - - - - X
Low + + + + +
Progress Cvi rve
Steep - - -
Flat + + + + +
Contractor Capacity
Excess - - - - -
Deficient + + + + +
TECHNICAL
Complexity
High X + + *
Medium + - + + +
Low + + + + +
State-of-the-art
Pushing X + + *
Within + + + + +
Other Applications
Yes + + +
No + + + + +
Private R&D
High X X -





Nominal + + + + +
Production
Lead Times
Long - - - - _
Short + + + + +
Degree of
Subcontract ing
Heavy - _ _ _
Light + + + + +
Contract
Complexity
Complex - - - - _
Simple + + + + +
Son r c e




IV. COMPETITION IN AUTOMOTIVE COMMODITIES
A. GENERAL
Table I, Chapter II, presented evidence that substantiated
the often heard claim that the introduction of competition into
weapon systems procurement could reduce the costs of these
systems. However, Table I presented data for only three
commodities: Electronics, Missile/Components, and Small Support
Equipment. None of these categories match the characteristics of
the Automotive commodity in which the Advanced Assault Amphibian
Vehicle (AAAV) would be included. The question posed then is:
"Will competition in Automotive commodities deliver the same
effect of reducing costs as had been observed in other
commodities"? A review of the procurement history of Automotive
commodities since 1959 indicates that the answer to this question
is "yes", and that three conclusions have been formulated: [Ref.
20:p. 5]
1. Automotive commodities have unique characteristics.
2. Competition can generate savings even when the incumbent
producer never looses.
3. Post award claims and adjustments may be a significant risk
of competition.
Table III presents a summary of the available historical data
showing the effects of competition on the contract pricing of
armor vehicles, which are contained within the Automotive
commodity [Ref. 20:p. 7]. The Table shows that
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TABLE III.
PROGRESS CURVES EXHIBITED IN THE ARMOR VEHICLE DATABASE
Vehicle Curve Slope Contract-to--Contract
S/Source Competitive Competitive S/Source
M113 100% 91% (7.0%)
M548 100% (9.0%)
M577 100% 12% (11.0%)
M125 100% 16% (15.0%)










Source: Competition in Automotive Commodities: Implications for
Competitve and Non-Competitive Acquisition Strategies
,
1982
when competition was present during the acquisition process,
savings resulted from unit price reductions due to the effect
of the learning curve. When competition was not present and
a sole source procurement was made, either negative or no
learning was demonstrated and unit prices exhibited a pattern
of price escalation. Appendix B presents the acquisition
price history of each vehicle and graphs the exhibited






The M113 is the base vehicle chassis for a family of
vehicles which includes the M113 Armor Personnel Carrier
(APC), M577 Command Post, M548 Cargo Carrier, M125 Mortar
Vehicle, and M106 Mortar Vehicle. FMC Corporation
continuously produced the vehicle from 1959 to 1982, the
years which the Watkin's study [Ref. 20] researched, with
derivative vehicles introduced at several points in the
production timeframe.
a. M113 Armor Personnel Carrier (APC)
The base vehicle, the M113, was introduced in
1959, in 1964 the M113A1 configuration was introduced with
several hundred minor changes but with no significant impact
on program cost, and in 1979 the M113A2 configuration was
introduced with significant design changes to the vehicle.
Due to these changes the M113A2 was excluded from the
research. [Ref. 20:p. 5]
The M113 APC was competed almost every year
between 1959-1971 on a winner-take-all award basis. In
addition, two multiyear contracts were awarded in 1965 and
1969. These production contracts resulted in over 38,000
vehicles being produced. Through this phase of the
acquisition the production demonstrated a price progression
commensurate with a 91% learning curve. [Ref. 20:p. 6]
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The competitive price behavior contrasts sharply
with the sole source award period between 1971-1978. The
acquisition price for these awards is distinguished by
constant dollar increase of approximately 7%. The very first
sole source award resulted in an increase of 16% over the
previous competitive award without any indication that the
increase was warranted by design changes. [Ref. 20:p. 8]
b. M548 Cargo Carrier
The M548 was competitively awarded only for the
first year's production. Subsequent awards were sole source
and demonstrated a pattern of 9% annual price increases.
[Ref. 20:p. 8]
c. M577 Command Post
The M577 was competitively awarded three times,
initially on the first production award, and later on two
non-consecutive awards. Prices for competitive awards
demonstrated 14% and 20% reductions in constant dollars,
while sole source awards averaged 11% increases excluding a
1969 award which tripled the quantity of vehicles. If this
award is taken into consideration the average cost growth is
7%. [Ref. 20:p. 8]
d. M125 Mortar Vehicle
The M125 was competed only once after initial
production. This competitive award demonstrated a 16% price
reduction in constant dollars, sole source awards averaged
15% price increases. [Ref 20:p. 8]
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e. M106 Mortar Vehicle
A total of seven production contracts were
awarded for this vehicle: two competitive, four sole source,
and the initial competitive award. Competitive awards
demonstrated price savings of 18% and 10%, while sole source
awards resulted in a 41% increase in constant dollars over
the initial contract price. [Ref. 20:p. 9]
f . Summary of M113 Family
Analysis of the M113 family clearly demonstrates
that for a period of 20 years competition exerted influence
on the price paid, in constant dollars, for the vehicle. The
most striking support for this conclusion rests with the fact
that for 12 years FMC had produced the M113 APC with a
demonstrated 91% progress curve, and that the price of the
vehicle in constant dollars dropped accordingly over the
period. After competitive awards ceased, the first sole
source award resulted in a 16% price increase. Similar
observations of price behavior when confronted with
competition, or the lack of such competition, are observed in
other vehicle variants and support the conclusion that
competition does favorably impact on the price paid for
automotive commodities. [Ref. 20 :p. 5]
2. M60 Main Battle Tank (MBT) Family
The M60 MBT was produced by Chrysler Corporation in
four configurations: M60, M60A1 , M60A2 , and M60A3 [Ref.
20:p. 10]. Pricing data for production contracts for all
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configurations are incomplete in available research material;
however, available data for the M60 and M60A1 configurations
indicate that MBT class vehicles exhibit competitive pricing
characteristics similar to other commodities.
a. M60 MBT
The M60 MBT was produced between 1959-1963,
information is only available for the first two years
procurement. The initial production contract for the M60 was
awarded in 1959 on a sole source emergency basis while a
competitive solicitation was prepared. The following year, a
final award was made to two contractors which resulted in a
31% reduction from the previous award. [Ref. 20:p. 10]
b. M60A1 MBT
The M60A1 was produced in non-consecutive sole
source production runs during 1962-1966, 1968-1972, and 1974-
1979. The period 1964-1976 demonstrated a pattern of rising
prices in constant 1980 dollars which amounted to a 49%
increase in per unit price. This pattern was exhibited even
though the vehicle configuration was relatively stable. The
years 1977-1979 were excluded from the study because several
expensive upgrades to the vehicle and the component breakout
of the track made comparison of prices impractical. [Ref
20:p. 11]
c. Summary MBT
MBT figures support the theory that competitive
pressure can achieve reductions in production price for
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automotive commodities. However, their relevance might be
questioned due to the confusion that existed in the program
and the breaks in production experienced. The acquisition
program for MBT ' s was in a state of turmoil from
approximately 1967-1976. It was during this timeframe that
the Army was involved with the unsuccessful development of
the M-70/XM-803 MBT. This MBT was supposed to be the
designated successor to the M60 family. The XM-803 program
was cancelled in December 1971 after a lengthy dispute with
Congress and was followed immediately by the controversial
XM-1 "Abrams" tank program. The transition of the XM-1 to
FSD on 12 November 1976 brought a measure of stability and
certainty to MBT production. The atmosphere of uncertainty
regarding the potential for future production of M-60 MBT ' s
,
in concert with the broken production phase contracts,
complicates drawing conclusions from MBT figures. However,
the exhibited price behavior does, on face value, support the
hypothesis that competition does affect the price of
automotive commodities. [Ref. 21 :p. B-6]
3. Assault Amphibian Vehicle (AAV) Family
The AAV7 family of vehicles consists of three
variants which include a Personnel, Communication, and
Retriever models. These vehicles were all produced under a
four year multiyear, firm fixed price contract, between 1970-
1973, with a total of 946 vehicles produced. The negotiated
contract price for the production demonstrated that the
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manufacturer, FMC Coproration, agreed to a 97% progress curve
during production. FMC was awarded the contract after
determination that its bid was the lowest priced of four
competiting offers. [Ref. 22:pp. 51-54]
C. SUMMARY
Chapter IV presented historical data reflecting the
awarded contract pricing exhibited by the Automotive
commodities, of which the AAAV is a member. The evidence
presented supports the hypothesis that the existence of
competition in the acquisition process can reduce the cost of
procuring a weapon system, and that in the absence of
competition the tendency is for the price of the system to
rise. The evidence also demonstrates that the progress curve
for Automotive commodities are generally shallow, and that
the most favorable curve exhibited to date is 91% for the
M113 APC vehicle. [Ref. 20:p. 5]
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V. ADVANCED ASSAULT AMPHIBIAN VEHICLE PROGRAM
A. GENERAL
The Advanced Assault Amphibian Vehicle (AAAV) is the U.S.
Marine Corps proposed answer to an identified mission need
for an over the horizon, surface assault capability, which is
capable of executing forced entry/assault operations. The
AAAV will be the next generation of Assault Amphibian Vehicle
(AAV) and will replace the AAV7A1 vehicle which was
introduced in 1982. The AAV7A1 utilized existing technology,
and incorporated it into the AAV7 family of vehicles through
a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP).




The AAAV has an Initial Operational Capability (IOC)
requirement of FY-99. The IOC was the primary constraint
considered when the program office formulated the acquisition
strategy [Ref. 23:p. 2]. Figure 8 shows the current
acquisition strategy milestone plan (all milestones begin in
the first quarter of the given fiscal year).
2 . Concept Exploration
The CE phase will occur over a 24 month period
commencing with Milestone which is scheduled to begin in
approximately January 1989. The current acquisition strategy


















Figure 8. AAAV Acquisition Strategy
Source: Developed by the Researcher.
design/study contracts to address such characteristics as
performance, supportability, producibility , cost, schedule,
and risk. The CE contract will also contain an option for
the conduct of the D&V Phase effort. [Ref. 23 :p. 5]
3. Demonstration and Validation
The D&V Phase will be exercised by two of the three
CE contractors. Award of these contracts will be based on
the contractor's concept design studies performed during CE
and the cost and technical proposals for the D&V effort.
[Ref. 23:p. 6]
The D&V Phase will require each contractor to design
and fabricate two AAAV personnel prototypes. In addition,
each contractor will be required to design and fabricate a
presently undetermined Mission Role Variant (MRV) prototype.
[Ref. 23:p. 6]
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Demonstration Test/Operational Test (DT/OT-1) is
scheduled over a six month period commencing in the second
quarter of FY-93 . The DT/OT-1 event will constitute a run-
off between competitive designs and together with technical
and cost proposals for FSD will serve as the basis for
transitioning the Milestone II Defense Acquisition Board
(DAB) review. In addition the program office will include in
the FSD solicitation a requirement for the predetermination
and pricing of proprietary rights to data and require each
contractor to develop a plan for assisting the Government in
establishing a second production source. [Ref. 23 :p. 6]
4. Full Scale Development
The present AAAV acquisition strategy calls for one
contractor to be carried forward into FSD. However, the
program office is considering: [Ref. 23:p. 7]
A teaming arrangement whereby a contract is awarded
to a firm other than the prime contractor to maintain an
engineering team that analyzes and participates in the
development of the FSD prime contractor's technical data.
The FSD contract will require the contractor to
continue to refine the AAAV design and to fabricate 15
prototype vehicles for a DT/OT-II effort commencing the third
quarter FY-95. DT-II will be conducted over a 30 month
period, with OT-II being conducted by Fleet Marine Force
units over a three month period early in FY-97. These
efforts will serve as a basis for transitioning the Milestone
III decision in late FY-98. [Ref. 23:p. 7]
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A Level III TDP will be required as a deliverable
item under the FSD contract.
5. Production
In order to meet the IOC requirement of FY-99, award
of the production contract (Milestone III) will be conducted
in late FY-98. It is anticipated that a single production
contract will be competitively awarded on a fixed-price type
contract utilizing the Level III TDP for a competitive
solicitation. Alternate strategies, which will be evaluated
as program uncertainties are resolved, include either a
competitive solicitation of a second source utilizing the
Government's Level III TDP, or the use of a Leader-Follower
option in the production contract which requires the prime to
develop a second source for the Government. [Ref. 23: p. 8]
The production will require the delivery of
approximately 1500 AAAV s with the production phase
encompassing a 40-60 month period.
C. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT AAAV ACQUISITION STRATEGY
1
. Design Competition
Analysis of the current AAAV acquisition strategy
indicates that the program office, in accordance with
SECNAVINST. 4210. 6A, is planning for design competition in
both the CE and D&V phases of acquisition. This competition,
as previously discussed, calls for the award of three
contracts entering CE , followed by a down selection to two
contractors entering D&V. In addition, as encouraged by
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DODI . 5000.2, the program office is requiring the prototyping
of two or more vehicles per contractor as a requirement
during the D&V phase. The prototyping effort will assist in
defining engineering and technical risk factors in the
program and provide for a "Shoot-off/Roll-of f " between the
competing designs. The design effort during CE and D&V fully
supports, within the limitations of the program budget, DOD
policy regarding maintaining design competition during early
phases of the acquisition cycle.
The acquisition strategy, however, currently calls
for a down selection to one contractor entering into a four
year FSD phase which will end design competition. In the
view of the program office, the primary limiting factor that
mandates this decision is the nonavailability of funds to
permit two separate contractors to manufacture 15 prototype
vehicles each during FSD [Ref. 23: Appendix G] . Current
budgetary planning for prototype vehicles procured during FSD
establishes a ceiling of $12.5 million per vehicle [Ref.
24:p. 13]. The maintenance of design competition into FSD
would require at a minimum an additional $187.5 million for
an additional 15 prototypes, plus additional management costs
to support the broadened program. Prototype vehicles are
scheduled for use in DT/OT-II testing during FSD with the
test results serving as the basis for the Milestone IIIA
decision.
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Splitting the budgeted prototype quantity between the
two contractors is not considered advantageous to the design
effort because of the tactical configuration of the AAV
platoon. This configuration consists of ten personnel (P)
vehicles per platoon, for which ten prototypes are dedicated,
with the five additional prototypes dedicated to vehicle
variants (Communications, Retriever etc.) and the
accompanying "chase" (P) vehicles. It is generally agreed
that the best results and analysis from DT/OT-II testing will
be derived from exercises that evaluate the vehicles in their
approved tactical and organizational units. Thus splitting
the prototype quantity would result in the side by side
testing of different designs, in quantities insufficient to
correctly evaluate their performance abilities or maintenance
requirements. [Ref. 25]
The down selection to one contractor entering FSD may
also encourage the introduction of a "buy-in" strategy by the
contractors. As previously discussed, the contractors will
face essentially a "winner-take-all" award entering FSD with
the view that whomever wins the development contract will
inevitably win the production contract. The likely
occurrence of a "buy-in" at a time when the technology
remains unproven, the design baseline is not final, and
issues involving producability are not resolved, sets a stage
that is conducive to potential cost escalation. Even if
production options could be utilized entering the FSD phase
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in an attempt to control costs and smooth the transition to
the production phase, it can be expected that the contractor
will either adjust the price of the option upwards to reflect
the degree of risk that exists, or later disown the
estimates
.
The use of production options as a selection criteria
for award of the FSD contract was employed in the M-l MBT
program as part of an intensive Design to Cost (DTC) effort
[Ref. 21:p. E-4] . The financial transition from FSD into
production was to be smoothed by exercising the production
options signed during competition for the FSD contract. The
options established a ceiling -price in accordance with DTC
goals for the first two years of production. Three years
later, however, when the Government exercised the options at
a Milestone IIIA decision for low rate initial production,
the ceiling price proved to be too low. The contractor
subsequently tried every method at its disposal to increase
the price including generating claims against the ceiling
price for equitable adjustments with the result that
substantial increases were made to the ceiling price [Ref.
21:p. G-6] . The program office stated: [Ref. 21:p. E-13]
In spite of all the good work done during the
process, one must realize there is no commitment on the
part of the contractor to finally sell the product at the
predicted price. Once the production decision is made,
the "sales job" conducted during FSD is over, and the
contractor will disown his own predictions and charge the
Government whatever the market will bear.
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In addition, the ever present attitude of "getting
well on engineering changes" that history has shown occurs
frequently, presents ample opportunity for a sole source to
recover financially from any commitments that were made in
the effort to acquire the contract. The AAV7 program
implemented 450 ECP ' s on the production of the AAV7 and over
2000 on the AAV7A1 . [Refs. 22 :p. 52, 26]
Though the program is considering a strategy of
awarding a contract to a firm other than the prime to
maintain an engineering team that analyzes and participates
in the development of the prime's technical data, this
strategy does not enhance or continue design competition.
This effort as envisioned will primarily support the
validation of the Level III TDP which is scheduled to be
delivered to the Government at the end of FSD, and enhances




The current strategy for attaining production
competition begins with the RFP for the FSD phase. In the
RFP the program office will state that: [Ref. 23 :p. 8]
One of the evaluation criterion for award of the FSD
contract will be the offer's plan for helping the
Government establish a second source for production
vehicles.
The requirement for the contractor to develop a
second sourcing plan for the Government's review puts the
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contractor on notice that production competition is a stated
objective of the program during the production phase. In
addition, the RFP will require a predetermination of data
rights and the elimination of proprietary data and contracts
for the delivery of a Level III TDP
.
b. TDP Strategy
It is on the Level III TDP, with the resultant
TDP Strategy, that the production competition strategy
currently rests.
Current production plans call for the competitive
award of a single contract to a sole source based on a
competitive solicitation utilizing the Level III TDP. If
design, production, and cost variables warrant, consideration
will be given to soliciting for a second production source
again utilizing the TDP, or the use of a Leader-Follower
Strategy should the technical complexity of the system
require
.
Experience with the TDP strategy has demonstrated
that it is the most hazardous of the dual sourcing
strategies, and is not well-suited for state-of-the-art
systems with unstable designs, unproven technical aspects,
and new production processes [Ref. 27:p. 14]. In addition to
the critical factors of craftman know-how and shop procedures
which cannot be definitized and recorded in the TDP, practice
has revealed that quite often the TDP has major deficiencies
in either accuracy, adequacy, currency, completeness or
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clarity [Ref. 14:pp. 47-48]. Once the data package is
accepted by the Government and is used as the basis for a
solicitation, the Government effectively guarantees the
adequacy of the package and assumes any resultant liability
should deficiencies appear. With the risk involved in the
use of the TDP strategy it is questionable whether, on a
production phase of only four to five years, this strategy
will deliver true competitive pressure on cost. This
strategy also adds the question of what action the program
office will take should another contractor underbid the
original FSD developer. A second contractor would be well
aware of past difficulties of production utilizing a TDP and
will be well aware of its legal options under situations of
defective specifications within the package. This could
result in a buy-in to the production contract knowing well
that there may be little possibility that it will actually be
called upon to perform as expected.
c. Leader-Follower
The current acquisition strategy recognizes the
possibility of introduction of a LF strategy either during
FSD or once into production. Introducing this strategy
during FSD equates with the program office's desire to form
what is termed a "teaming arrangement" in the acquisition
strategy, and calls for the follower to "maintain an
engineering team that analyzes and participates in the
development of the FSD prime contractor's technical data
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package" [Ref. 23:p. 7]. This strategy has the advantage of
requiring potential leaders to submit LF plans as a source
selection criterion for the FSD contract award while
competitive pressures still exist. This use of this option
increases the probability of an effective technology
transfer. The program office will evaluate this option as
program variables develop to a reliable level.
3 . Prototyping
The extent of the prototyping effort by the program
office warrants special discussion because it is, at this
moment, the prime cost reducing technique being utilized in
the acquisition strategy. It also provides for a more
concrete comparison of design concepts during design
competition than would be possible using only paper concepts
and diagrams.
The increased use of prototype systems was encouraged
by the "President's Blue Ribbon Commission On Defense
Management", better known as the Packard Commission, which
recommended: [Ref. 28 :p. 55]
A high priority on building and testing prototype
systems to demonstrate that new technology can
substantially improve military capability, and to provide
a basis for realistic cost estimates prior to a full-
scale development decision. Operational testing should
begin early in advanced development, using prototype
hardware
.
Research evidence comparing 17 mature programs, with
four of these programs utilizing prototyping efforts (A-10,
F-16, AH-23, and UH-60), indicates those programs that
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utilized prototyping experienced lower than average cost
growth. This occurred because prototyping appeared to
enhance and reaffirm the accuracy of previous cost estimates,
and provided contractors a better appreciation of system
interfaces and for possible production difficulties that
could be encountered. Also prototyping appears to increase
system quality by providing earlier and more detailed
identification of potential problems during DT/OT testing.
Flight tests of both the A-10 and F-16 aircraft indicated
several problems ranging from simple pilot dissatisfaction
with the cockpit layout of the A-10 to autostabilization
problems with the F-16. Identification of potential problems
during FSD provides an opportunity to correct these problems
before they appear on production models that could require
expensive corrective action. [Ref. 29:p. 35]
D. SUMMARY
Chapter V presented the acquisition strategy as currently
proposed in "Plan for Assault Amphibian Vehicles" [Ref. 23].
The strategy as stands emphasizes design competition, in
conjunction with an aggressive prototyping effort, during the
CE and D&V phases. The strategy acknowledges the possibility
or potential for production competition, and envisions the
use of either a TDP or LF method should program variables
indicate that the benefits from such an effort would be
advantageous to the Government. In Chapter VI an analysis
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will be presented which evaluates the merits of introducing
production competition through a second sourcing effort.
73
VI. DUAL SOURCING ANALYSIS
A. ANALYSIS OF PROGRAM VARIABLES UTILIZING THE SECOND SOURCE
METHOD SELECTION MODEL
Preliminary analysis of the AAAV program for suitability
in using a second sourcing competitive strategy will be
accomplished employing the SSMSM. Table IV presents the




The anticipated AAAV requirements of the Marine
Corps are approximately 1500 vehicles of all types. This
includes a proposed production requirement for the AAAV
"Personnel" variant of approximately 1375 vehicles [Ref.
30:p. 1-5]. This figure also allows for approximately 125
total vehicle variants for the Marine Corps, i.e.,
Communication and Retriever vehicles. Current estimates for
foreign military sales expect that a maximum of 500 vehicles
will be ordered [Ref. 25]. Totalling the needs of both the
Marine Corps and foreign sales results in a total of between
1600-2000 vehicles ultimately produced.
This quantity is low by commodity standards when
compared to the procurement of 54,959 M113/M113A1 vehicles,
or over 8,800 M60/M60A1 MBT ' s . Present production plans for
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TABLE IV
SECOND SOURCE METHOD SELECTION MODEL
Decision Form Technical Directed Leader Contractor
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the M-l "Abrams" MBT are in excess of 7,300 vehicles and over
7,200 of the M-2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV).
Though the AAAV quantity is low by commodity
standards it still represents an increase in AAV assets for
the Marine Corps of between 4-12%. In addition, when
compared with the results of the AAV7 production in which 946
vehicles were manufactured by a sole source at a rate of 30-
35 per month, and if an optimistic outlook of 400-500 AAAV's
for foreign military sales is considered, it is conceivable
that two production sources could effectively compete for a
split production of nearly 2,000 vehicles. This variable is
rated "LOW" based on comparison with historical Automotive
commodity production data for vehicles.
b. Production Duration
The duration of the production phase is
anticipated to be between 40-60 months [Ref. 25]. This
estimate was computed by dividing the minimum/maximum vehicle
requirements by the anticipated production rate of 30-35
vehicles per month. This variable is equivalent to the four
year production of the AAV7 family, but is considered a short
duration when compared to the 29 years production experienced
by the M113 family, the 10 years of the M60 MBT, and the
current eight years of the Ml MBT and the M-2 BFV. This
variable is rated as "SHORT" based on comparison with
historical automotive commodity production data for vehicles.
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c. Industrial Facilities
Historically the industrial facilities investment
for the establishment of a production line capable of
producing armor vehicles is substantial. The Life Cycle Cost
Estimate (LCCE) for the AAAV anticipates industrial
facilities of $238,253,000 in FY 88 dollars [Ref. 30:p. 1-
12]. This amount was derived by determining the cost of
facilities as a percentage of total recurring hardware cost
for six other armor vehicle programs (Ml, BFV, MHO, M551,
M113, and M114A1) at the 1000th unit and computing the mean
of the values. This mean value (8.1%) was applied to the
computed recurring hardware cost for the 1000th. unit of the
hypothetical LCCE AAAV to arrive at the estimated facilities
cost. [Ref. 30:p. 3-22]
The LCCE industrial facilities cost estimate
methodology, however, may be considered flawed or pessimistic
in the approach employed to determine the facilities cost.
This is because the AAAV will more closely resemble in size
and complexity the characteristics of the M113 and the BFV.
These two vehicles are both in the armored personnel
carrier/armored fighting vehicle family, and have
characteristics different than those exhibited by MBT ' s (Ml)
or self-propelled artillery vehicles (MHO). The BFV and
M113 have demonstrated industrial facilities costs, as a
percent of recurring hardware costs at the 1000th unit, of
2.0 and 2.3 percent respectively. The other vehicles used in
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the study, notably the Ml and the MHO, have industrial
facilitization costs of 13.0 and 13.7 percent respectively.
These classes of vehicles are substantially heavier, carrying
up to twice the weight of the AAAV, and mandate the added
effort required to handle a large turret/weapon station which
will not be present with the AAAV. [Ref. 30:p. 3-23]
If the facilities costs of the BFV and the M113
are averaged, a mean value of 2.15% results. Using an
industrial facilities cost value in the area of 2.15% results
in a cost of $68,989,200 for 1500 vehicles. This figure
compares favorably with an estimate of $50 million for
industrial facilities suggested by FMC Corporation when
questioned about the required facilities to produce a
hypothetical AAAV [Ref. 32]. This variable is rated "LOW"
when compared to other armored vehicles.
d. Progress Curve
Progress curves for armor vehicles, as indicated
in Chapter IV, are flat/shallow. The most favorable curve
exhibited was for the M113 vehicle at 91% over a 12 year
period during which approximately 38,000 vehicles were
produced. A progress curve of 97% was negotiated for a four
year multiyear contract with FMC Corporation for the
production of the AAV7 family of vehicles in 1972 [Ref. 22 :p.
52]. An interview with a program executive currently
involved with the manufacture of the BFV indicates a progress
curve of 88%-90% could be obtainable during production runs
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Contractor capacity at the time of production is
unknown, but is assumed to be adequate for the effort
required. Since no production facility is currently
manufacturing AAV vehicles it should be possible to minimize
the problems associated with excess contractor capacity.
Knowing the program requirements for total production and
production rate, and should a dual sourcing strategy be
committed to, the program office could facilitize each
developer for 60-70% of planned capacity or the minimum
production facilities capable of manufacturing the AAAV.
This variable is rated "DEFICIENT" based on the above




The AAAV as currently envisioned will be a highly
complex system employing subsystems not used in any other
armor vehicle. These systems may include a developmental
marine drive system capable of skimming a 62,000 lb. armor
vehicle over the water at 25 knots, a retractable suspension
system, a remotely operated weapon station, a developmental
2200 horsepower engine, and a composite material hull with
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applique ballistic armor protection. The rating of this
variable is rated "HIGH". [Ref. 25]
b. State-of-the-Art
The technology involved with the AAAV will be
increasing the capabilities of amphibious assault well beyond
those that exist in any other similar vehicle. If water
speed performance specifications are met, a minimum 300%
increase over the existing system is required. The variable
is rated "PUSHING".
c. Other Applications
The AAAV i s an amphibious armor vehicle unique to
the U.S. Marine Corps and foreign military organizations with
similar missions. Material and subsystems developed for this
vehicle will have little or no probability for other use.
This variable is rated "NO". [Refs. 25, 32]
d. Private Research and Development
The U.S. Marine Corps has continued to fund R&D
efforts in the AAAV program, though at times under different
program titles, since the early 1970' s. It currently
possesses all technical data rights for several major
components of the system and according to the current
acquisition strategy will acquire data rights to all
components arising from further development. This variable
is rated "LOW". [Refs. 25, 32]
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3. Program Management Variables
a. Maintenance Requirements
The maintenance requirements for the AAAV
necessitate the fielding of identical versions of the
vehicle. The maintenance philosophy calls for the vehicle to
have major repairs performed behind the forward edge of the
battle area by AAAV maintenance personnel organic to the AAV
battalion and company. It is impractical to train
maintenance personnel to repair more than one version of the
vehicle and for logistics organizations to supply and
transport multiple uncommon replacement parts. This variable
is rated "COMPLEX".
b. Production Lead Times
Past experience with AAV vehicles has
demonstrated that there are few long lead time elements
involved with production of the vehicle. However, since the
AAAV is a new vehicle with no similar vehicle in existence
there exists some likelihood that a major production
component may fall within this category. This variable is
rated "SHORT" based on historical precedence.
c. Degree of Subcontracting
The AAV7 was produced by FMC corporation almost
in its entirety with a minimal amount of subcontracting. The
degree of subcontracting increased; however, with the Service
Life Extension Program (SLEP) of the AAV7 to the AAV7A1 but
was still light. Discussions with FMC Corporation who have
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considerable experience with the production of AAV's and who
are currently the sole source for the BFV indicate that
approximately 40% of the unit hardware cost should be
subcontracted [Ref. 31]. Based on the above analysis this
variable is rated "HEAVY".
d. Contract Complexity
The present acquisition strategy calls for the
award of fixed-price type contracts for development and
production of the vehicle [Ref. 23: Appendix H] . This
variable is rated "SIMPLE" based on the acquisition strategy.
B. DUAL SOURCING METHODOLOGY ANALYSIS
The SSMSM model provides a framework in which to judge
the relevancy of each variable and to provide for a side-by-
side comparison of their ratings. The model allows the user
to evaluate the merits of each methodology, discard those not
suited to the program from further consideration, and
recommend areas which might require further analysis in
making the dual sourcing decision.
1. Directed Licensing
The DL methodology should not be applicable to the
AAAV program because the current acquisition strategy calls
for a predetermination of proprietary rights in the FSD RFP
.
In addition, concurrent development has provided the
Government with unlimited data rights to several primary
subsystems of the vehicle, including the marine drive,
retractable suspension, and engine. Since the Government
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will possess unlimited rights to all technical data, the DL
method is not a valid method for consideration.
2. Form, Fit, and Function
The singular overriding variable that makes this
methodology unacceptable for use in obtaining production
competition is the organic, low echelon maintenance
philosophy of the AAAV. The F3 methodology would create two
"black box" versions of the vehicle, which although by
definition would function identically, would nevertheless
prove totally impractical to logistically support in tactical
operations. Such an effort could conceivably field two
versions of the vehicle with no two parts above the nut and
bolt level the same. This arrangement would prove impossible
to support in battlefield conditions logistically, and would
also pose numerous manpower problems in providing for
maintenance personnel.
3. Technical Data Package
Analysis of the TDP strategy using the SSMSM reveals
that the use of this method to introduce production
competition poses several areas of risk for the AAAV program.
These areas are mostly weighted towards the technical aspects
of the program with "particulary inappropriate" ratings given
in the model for the variables of "system complexity" and
"state-of-the-art". These ratings reflect the historical
difficulty experienced by programs in validating TDP ' s that
are capable of allowing the system to be manufactured by the
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second source. Since technology transfer is achieved solely
on the basis of the TDP with no contractor-to-contractor
dialogue, the success or failure of this strategy will
depend chiefly on the quality of the TDP.
a. Delivery/Development of the Technical Data
Package
An area of risk that must be considered with this
method is the potential for the late delivery of the TDP
which can be caused by actions of either the Government or
the contractor. Dale W. Church, former Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
(Acquisition Policy) stated in congressional testimony that:
[Ref. 15:p. 21]
The reason I mention validated data packages is that
their development typically takes four to five years. If
you wait four to five years from the start of production
to go into competition with the second source, you have
built so many units that there are not enough left for
the second source.
One reason for this problem in complex systems is
that freezing the baseline configuration of the system by the
Government is extremely difficult. Upgrades and quality
improvements are frequently introduced with the result that
quite often timely changes to the master data package are not
made. Also, the desire by engineers and the program office
to field the most modern system can encourage repeated
changes to the design. The inability of the program office
to freeze the production design of the M-l resulted in the
TDP being delivered approximately 13 months late. This
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situation can even be worsened when the contractor decides,
for whatever reason, to trade-off reliability or
maintainability factors during FSD in exchange for cost
reductions. This was alleged to have occurred in the M-l
program when the developer was acting under the pressure of
an intensive "Design to Cost" effort. This resulted in the
system being fielded to meet the initial operational
capability requirement and almost immediately requiring
extensive design changes to correct problems. TDP validation
difficulty was the common experience reported in the "lessons
learned" documents published by other programs. [Ref. 21 :p.
F-5]
In the case of the AAV7A1 , the "Physical Tear
Down Logistics Demonstration" (PTLD) currently nearing
completion at Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, Georgia,
is just now completing validation of the Master Data Package
three years after the last vehicle was accepted [Ref 26].
The program can also discover that the developing
source may find that it is in his best interest to maintain a
high rate of change. This instability can lead to a
situation were competition is not possible because current,
accurate, and complete data are not available. [Ref. 17 :p.
63]
It is also generally impractical to provide
meaningful negative or positive incentives to encourage
timely delivery/upgrading of data since it is unlikely,
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especially if the contractor has excess capacity, that any
combination of incentives will match the amount of lost cash
flow due to the introduction of competition.
b. Revolutionary and Evolutionary Systems
New state-of-the-art systems that are often
revolutionary or that plan for evolutionary change as a means
of cost control and fielding improved versions of the system
can complicate the TDP strategy implementation. The
technical nature of these systems equates them to the
complex, state-of-the-art systems that the TDP strategy is
not particulary suited to support. As previously discussed,
the AAAV will be a revolutionary system and can be expected
to encounter difficulties with design stability.
The BFV program office stated that one of the
major considerations in deciding against whether the TDP
strategy would be beneficial to introducing production
competition in the program was the "revolutionary" nature of
the vehicle, combined with the "evolutionary" character of
the vehicle. The BFV was revolutionary because it departed
in numerous ways, both in design and intended tactical use,
from its predecessor the M113. Its character is termed
evolutionary because the vehicle is expected to grow and
change incorporating new advances in weapons,
communications, and engineering as they are developed. An
evolutionary system then is distinguished by the introduction
of numerous design changes and their incorporation at a high
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tempo into an upgraded system. This has occurred to a degree
in the BFV that it is often reported that no two vehicles are
the same. The changes that result with evolutionary and
revolutionary systems make the validation and acceptance of
the TDP a risk filled endeavor. [Ref 33]
c. Time Required to Implement the Strategy
Time, the short duration of the production phase,
also works against the use of the TDP strategy for the AAAV
program. The review of literature finds some disagreement on
the earliest time that a TDP strategy might be introduced,
but the general consensus is that the third year of
production is about the soonest the effort should be
attempted with the fourth year or thereafter the main
consensus
.
In only one case, the M113 where the FSD
developer won the contract, did a program initiate
competition from the first production award utilizing the
TDP. Though this program was successful, the complexity of
the system was minimal and design changes were unexpected and
eventually introduced only after several years production.
[Ref. 20:pp. 5-7]
Two complex systems that successfully used the
TDP strategy, the AIM-7F (SPARROW) missile and the AGM-88A
High Speed Anti-Radiation (HARM) missile demonstrate the
usual scenario. The HARM had been developed by Texas
Instruments and produced since 1982 when the dual sourcing
87
RFP was issued on 17 May 1984, two years after production had
begun. The SPARROW missile had been produced by Raytheon
since 1956 with upgraded versions introduced until 1972 when
the AIM-7F was fielded. General Dynamics was established as
a second source in 1974 and began head-to-head competition in
1977. A three year period was required to validate the TDP
and qualify GD as the second source, with a total of five
years elapsing since production of the AIM-7F first began.
Though both programs are considered successful second
sourcing efforts, both programs reported TDP validation and
product baseline freezing as problem areas. [Refs. 14:pp.
67-79, 34:p. 31]
d. Potential Government Liability
Studies indicate that substantial Government
liability may be entailed with the TDP solicitation should
the TDP prove inadequate for production. Once the TDP is
accepted from the developer, the Government effectively
guarantees its accuracy and adequacy for production. [Ref.
27:p. 14]
In six competitive missile procurements held
during the 1960 's in which the second source won a contract
based on a TDP solicitation, four cases resulted in claims
against the Government which ranged from $4.2 million to $40
million. The fifth case resulted in the second source
experiencing a $16 million overrun which it did not claim,
and in the sixth case the Government was required to pay
88
engineers from the developer to solve problems encountered by
the second source. The result is that second source
contractors have a built-in insurance policy when building to
a TDP provided by the Government. [Ref. 5: pp. 49-50]
4. Leader-Follower
a. Program Risk: "A Mixed Bag"
The LF method of introducing competition is
similar to the TDP method except that the complexity of the
system prescribes that without the assistance of the
developer, the second source would not be able to manufacture
the system. This method's use in the AAAV program is
supported by the SSMSM analysis due to the nature of the
"complexity" and "state-of-the-art" variables and recommends
that transfer of data/technology be accomplished through
face-to-face exchange.
The LF method presupposes, however, the existence
of a TDP adequate for competition, and may therefore
experience several of the difficulties expounded upon in
discussing the TDP method. Whether the LF method requires a
validated TDP is subject to debate, though acquiring a
validated TDP may prohibit competition because of the delays
involved. These delays could result in competition no longer
being feasible because insufficient production quantities
remain. While the use of a TDP that has evolved from
development phases may be adequate, it will increase the
risks of undocumented engineering changes, schedule slippage,
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and cost increases. The expertise of the leader is the
factor the program office anticipates will "bridge the gap"
between the production TDP and a validated TDP . The benefit
of a higher assurance of technology transfer obtained from a
properly executed LF strategy is what a planner expects will
reduce risk to acceptable levels. [Ref. ll:pp. 45-46]
Reliance on the leader to execute technology
transfer, especially in view of the ultimate consideration
that the follower is soon to become a competitor, should
provide ample reason for the program office to vigilantly
monitor all data transfer. One program that demonstrates the
potential risk that is assumed due to a LF strategy's
reliance on the leader is the AIM-54C PHOENIX missile. In a
report on the program's configuration management, dated 22
August 1988, the Defense Department's Inspector General has
stated that: [Ref. 35:p. 330]
In supplying factory test sets to Raytheon in
preparation for dual sourcing, Hughes (Aircraft)
delivered equipment for which test sets did not match
drawings, parts were obsolete, specification test
procedures were missing, or test instruction
specification limits did not match specifications.
The Inspector General has recommended that the Navy reassess
its plans for dual sourcing until the Raytheon missile
completes testing in 1990.
The Navy has rebutted and nonconcurrs with the
findings and affirms that the missile is ready for dual
sourcing. The Navy has also stated that: [Ref. 35:p. 331]
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The assessment requested would delay the competitive
award by 15 months ... causing a 12 month interuption of
production or require a noncompetitive contract for low
rate production. . . causing the Navy to requalify the
second source or pay the cost of maintaining a qualified
production facility.
It is apparant that the risk assumed in a LF
strategy is a "mixed bag" in that risk reduction is assumed
through the use of the Leader's expertise, but that blind
reliance on the Leader could actually increase risk. If
supervised correctly, the LF strategy can be beneficial to
ensuring technology transfer, but should not be considered as
a waiver for close supervision of the effort.
b. Early Potential for Production Competition
The limited production quantity of the AAAV will
require that production competition be introduced early to
make the effort economically justifiable. Though not
recommended for short duration programs by the SSMSM, the LF
methodology can be tailored to achieve this goal. A
successful LF strategy could could conceivably initiate
competiton in the second year of production [Ref. 16:p. 34].
The prospect of early competition dictates that a commitment
to a LF strategy be made upon entering the FSD phase. This
would be in line with the current acquisition strategy of
contracting with a firm, other than the prime, to maintain an
engineering team that participates in the development of the
prime's technical data. This strategy as currently
envisioned can easily be modified to conform to the LF
methodology. In addition, if it is assumed that the follower
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is a firm familiar with and perhaps currently manufacturing
other armor vehicles, the face-to-face exchange of
technological data and production processes may provide the
impetus that could assure the early qualification of the
second source.
c. Program Flexibility
The LF method provides flexibility for the
program by allowing time for program variables to develop
before committing to a particular strategy while striking a
balance between increased program risk and cost. If the
program office feels that variables have developed
sufficiently during CE and D&V to support an aggressive
second sourcing effort, the LF strategy could be implemented
upon entering FSD and the follower could learn and observe
throughout this phase. This scenario of an early commitment
to a LF strategy with the accompying start of technology
transfer will increase the potential for early production
competition.
If variables have not developed to the point
where they could be used as a basis for implementing a second
sourcing strategy, and the Government desires to maintain
this option for further evaluation at reduced cost, the LF
method could be included as an option in the FSD RFP . By
doing this, the Government could receive the benefits of a
fully priced option and commitment from the leader to
participate in the strategy, and would have accomplished this
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while the leader was still under competitive pressure for
award of the FSD contract. This competitive pressure with
the LF option used as a selection criteria would assist in
limiting the cost of such a strategy. The ultimate decision
whether or not to actually exercise the option could then be
based on analysis of FSD prototyping and DT/OT II testing.
If the maturity of the design, technical problems, budgetary
reductions, or reduced procurement quantities indicate at the
end of FSD that competition is not warranted, the Government
could decide not to exercise the LF option. In either case,
the possibility of competition is left open to the program to
use if warranted.
d. Added Program Expense
Variables that should be considered with a LF
method include the increased cost of the technology transfer,
the cost of possible positive incentives/award fees to
motivate the leader and encourage technology transfer, and
the increased program management in managing two contractors
during the technology transfer itself. Though these areas
are potential disadvantages with the LF method, their effect
can be minimized through early planning and commitment to the
a LF strategy.
For instance, the program can include in its RFP
for the FSD contract a requirement the proposals include
plans for the implementation of a LF strategy. This would
include both a time schedule for technology transfer and a
93
fully priced option for the effort. If the strategy is
committed to when competition for the FSD contract still
exists, the program may find that the price is not
prohibitive
.
The cost and use of incentives to motivate the
leader should be considered by the program. It must be
remembered that the leader has substantial reason for not
wanting to qualify a second competitive source. To motivate
the leader, positive incentives such as award fees for early
qualification of the second source and for meeting technology
transfer milestones is appropriate. Negative incentives can
also be employed, such as reducing progress payments if
technology milestones are not met. [Ref. 36:p. 17]
e. Increased Management Requirements
Throughout the preparation for the FSD and
production phases the program office may feel that it has few
or inadequate resources to meet all the commitments that are
transpiring. The LF methodology may well require the most
continuous supervision of any of the five second sourcing
methods, and may further strain the resources of the program
staff. Reasons for this include the time, effort, and cost
necessary to meet the following requirements:
1. To analyze and select which of three contracting
methods to use in implementing the LF strategy.
2. If the Government chooses the follower, effort will be
required to solicit and award the contract.
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3. If the leader is permitted to choose the follower,
resources will be expended to review and confirm the
selection.
4. Monitoring the progress of the LF team in meeting the
milestones of the technology transfer plan.
5. Preparing for and reviewing the follower production
qualification which may include first article testing.
Though the use of an LF strategy has some
obstacles or costs that must be resolved with the available
program resources, none appear at this moment to be
insurmountable. The key factor may well prove to be early
planning and commitment to the strategy prior to entering
FSD. An examination of successful programs employing a LF
strategy noted the following essential characteristics: [Ref
ll:pp. 47-48]
1. First year production of the system by the developer-
leader, during which time the TDP is validated.
2. Concurrent with release of the first production
equipment, a competition among established producers
for selection of a second source.
3. Award of an educational buy with option provisions to
the follower to enable him to become proficient in
manufacturing the hardware.
4. Follower production of a small quantity of items for
qualification testing, with technical assistance
furnished by the leader.
5. Exercise of option by the Government so that the
follower can demonstrate his capability to achieve
quantity production.
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6. Split buy awards between the leader and follower.
7. Winner-take-all, buy-out competition for remaining
production quantities.
5. Contractor Teaming
Analysis of the Contract Teaming strategy using the
SSMSM suggests that this method of introducing production
competition may present several advantages for the AAAV
program. These advantages include increased effectiveness of
the technology transfer, greater flexibility in the
acquisition strategy implementation, earlier implementation
of production competition, and reduced Government liability
for design specifications.
The disadvantages that may be experienced with this
strategy include schedule slippage, increased Government
management required to supervise two contractors, possible
program cost increases, and possible reluctance of the team
members to split for production competition. In addition,
the primary disadvantage is that a commitment to the CT
strategy must be made at the latest upon entering FSD, and
once the team is formed, it may well prove impractical to
split the team if difficulties with the arrangement develop.
a. Program Flexibility, But at a Price
The primary advantage received from the CT method
is the flexibility that it provides the acquisition strategy
in regards to achieving production competition, but at the
price of commitment to the strategy early in the acquisition
process. The acquisition strategy currently plans for design
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competition to end upon entering the FSD phase, with the
ultimate result as previously discussed that any possibility
for production competition will rest with either the high
risk use of a TDP strategy, or the moderate risk associated
with the use of a LF strategy. A major recommendation of all
the programs reviewed, and a current desire of the AAAV
program, has been to continue design competition and increase
the possibility of production competition by maintaining two
contractors through the FSD phase if funding permits. The CT
method achieves part and perhaps all of this goal.
Should it be determined as program variables firm
up during FSD that dual productions sources are not
economically feasible, the program office would retain the
option of competitively awarding a sole source contract based
on a production RFP to team members. Under this situation
the use of production options or a multiyear contract for the
full duration of the production contract could prove
beneficial in securing the benefits of competition throughout
the production. The use of a four year multiyear contract on
the AAV7 program in 1970 as previously discussed resulted in
a price behavior indicative of a 97% progress curve. It
would be reasonable to assume that this price behavior could
be equalled or improved upon with two experienced contractors
in competition for a winner-take-all award. The decision
could also be made to keep the team together to certify two
production sources for industrial base or surge
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considerations and have each contractor manufacture those
systems with which it has the most experience. Such a
strategy is currently envisioned by the ATA program where
splitting the team is not presently envisioned [Ref. 37].
b. Program Cost
Cost increases in a teaming arrangement are
possible since the program office finds itself dealing with
two contractors. This means the possibility exists that the
Government may find itself paying for two overhead rates,
design efforts, additional travel, profit, and other similar
expenses
.
Design, overhead rates and profit for two
contractors have not currently generated cost increases on
programs utilizing the CT method primarily because of the
decision by team members to employ a joint venture teaming
arrangement over the use of a prime contractor/subcontractor
teaming arrangement. The advantage of the former over the
latter teaming arrangement stems from its incorporation of
single amounts for overhead rates and profit for the new
financial entity formed through the joint venture. In the
latter method the likelihood that the prime will place
overhead and profit on top of its team members overhead and
profit is increased. This situation was encountered in the
ATA program where Northrop, Grumman, and LTV (N/G/L) teamed,
with Northrop as the prime and Grumman and LTV as
subcontractors. In proposals submitted in response to RFP's,
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Northrop placed its own overhead and profit on top of that
submitted by subcontractor team members. This factor was
identified as a contributor to the N/G/L proposal being
priced higher than the GD/MCD proposal. Since GD/MCD won the
FSD contract the program has experienced no cost increase due
to these factors. [Ref. 37]
The ATF program which is utilizing a CT strategy,
also in a prime/subcontractor teaming arrangement, reports no
program cost increase due to its use of firm fixed-price
contracts during CE and D&V phases. The program office
reported that they budgeted for fixed amounts of funding for
each contractor and awarded contracts that did not exceed the
budgeted amounts. However, it was freely admitted that the
teams are spending perhaps as much as 50% more on development
than funded for in the contract. It may prove impractical
though for other programs to use fixed-price type contracts
for development work as the ATF did because program and
industry variables may be considerably different. [Ref. 38]
Interviews with Business Financial Managers from
the V-22 and ATA programs characterize any cost increases
experienced as minor, but neither could accurately quantify
the amount. The ATA program expressed an opinion that no or
only insignificant additional costs were attributed to the
teaming strategy, while the V-22 program reported that the
only identifiable cost increase was for additional office
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space rented for the establishment of a joint office in the
Washington D.C. area for the Bell/Boeing team. [Refs. 37,
39]
c. Increased Quality of Technology Transfer
The technological aspects of the program, in
particular the "complexity" and the "state-of-the-art"
variables, have ratings that indicate that this method is
particulary suited for application in the program. This
method has been used by other programs of equal or greater
complexity, ATA, ATF, V-22, and ASPJ (Airborne Self
Protection Jammer), with satisfactory results to date.
A major factor in the establishment of production
competition is the quality of the technology transfer. With
the CT method, the technology transfer is enhanced through
direct contractor-to-contractor exchange of information
between contractors who have worked together, most likely for
several years, and who are familiar with the partner's
methods. No other methodology theoretically provides the
quality of learning that is experienced by both contractors
than the CT strategy where both participate in design and
test efforts. Even in the use of the LF method, which in
accordance with the FAR is used only when the complexity of
the system warrants direct contractor-to-contractor
technology transfer, the question of the leader's motivation
to teach the follower arises. Though the possibility exists
that as the point of splitting the team approaches one
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contractor may withhold technology from the other in an
attempt to gain an advantage in production, both the V-22 and
ATA programs report great satisfaction with technology
transfer to date. [Refs. 37, 39, 40
:
p . 27]
d. Increased Potential for Design Innovation
Maintaining two contractors through FSD may
deliver several advantages to the program in regards to
design innovation. First, there is the synergistic effect
that may be experienced by two contractors working together
with complimentary skills. This should be especially
noticeable during the D&V phase when contract teams are still
competing against one another for award of the FSD contract.
Once into FSD the team will still have two sets of
views/outlooks from which to approach design efforts.
Second, it is reasonable to assume that each contractor will
have certain areas of expertise that should compliment the
partner. This expertise may provide faster more innovative
answers to problems that are encountered throughout testing.
The emergence and use of complimentary skills is
one of the observed strengths on both the V-22 and ATA
programs. In the ATA program, MCD possesses experience with
the design and manufacturing requirements for aircraft that
are capable of landing on aircraft carriers, while GD
possesses experience with aspects of state-of-the-art
"stealth" technology [Ref. 37]. In the V-22 program, Boeing
has experience in designing conventional fixed wing aircraft,
101
while Bell's area of experience centers on helicopters. This
combination of capabilities was advantageous to designing a
system that demonstrates the performance capabilities of both
a fixed-wing aircraft and a helicopter [Refs. 39, 40:p. 28].
e. Earliest Potential for Production Competition
As previously mentioned, technical data alone has
often proved insufficient in providing a contractor with all
the knowledge required to build a system. A primary
advantage gained with the CT method is that production "know
how" is also developed and transferred through the
prototyping subphase of FSD. The joint qualification of
production sources resulting from the co-development effort
presents the possibility of competition earlier than any
other method and at a level of substantially reduced risk.
The V-22 program which is scheduled to begin
production during March 1990 currently plans for head-to-head
competition to begin with the second year's award. The first
year's production of 12 aircraft will be split so that the
team manufactures the first eight aircraft to validate the
design and manufacturing processes, and the individual team
members to solely produce two of the remaining four aircraft
to qualify as production sources. The limited quantity of
aircraft produced during the first year's production, between
one and two per cent of the planned procurement, also leaves
ample quantities of production aircraft for competition in
follow on years. [Ref. 39]
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f. Decreased Government Liability
In soliciting for a second source utilizing
design specifications contained in a Level III TDP , the
Government assumes liability that the data are sufficient to
perform the contract. The CT method reduces or eliminates
the Government's potential liability because both potential
sources developed the data. It will prove difficult for a
contractor to make a substantial claim for equitable
adjustment for design flaws or the inclusion of inappropriate
production processes which it helped develop or recommend.
g. Potential Schedule Slippage
Though all the programs interviewed reported no
schedule slippage caused directly by the teaming strategy,
the V-22 program reported an impression of delay in the team
making "timely decisions". This was believed to have
occurred because executives in the joint venture were
occasionally "dual hatted" and held positions in both the
joint venture and their parent corporate structure. This
meant that issues had to be resolved first at the team level
in Washington D.C., then are often referred to corporate
level for review, and finally may have entailed
reconciliation between corporate headquarters for a final
decision. The primary reason given credit that schedule
slippage has not occurred is that the teaming agreement
between the contractors specifies who is ultimately
responsible for each subsystem, i.e., Bell has responsibility
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for the wing components and Boeing has responsibility for
fuselage components. Though discussions are required between
team members to keep appraised of current situations, the
final authority for decisions on a particular subsystem rests
with only one corporation allowing that team member to make
the necessary decisions. [Ref. 39]
h. Program Management
Program office's have expressed an opinion that
managing a program with a teaming strategy is a more complex
and demanding effort. Though they could not quantify this
variable, matters that surfaced as potential problems
included dealing with two or more sets of management
structures, dealing with the geographic dispersion of the
team member's home offices regardless of the joint venture
office in Washington, and dealing with two different Defense
Contract Administration Services (DCAS) offices or Plant
Representative Offices in different DCAS regions. Though
their opinions expressed that managing the teaming effort was
more complex than other program methods that may have been
employed, no program would change the teaming strategy if
presented another opportunity to reconstruct the acquisition
strategy. [Refs. 37, 38, 39]
i . Reluctance to Compete
A new phenomenon that may arise out of the CT
methodology is the reluctance of team members to split for
competition. As the completion of a program's FSD phase
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draws near, the program office may find that the team members
are not in favor of splitting the team and competing head-
to-head. The team may find many reasons for this and may
talk to as many officials in authority as will listen in an
effort to stop the planned team split and the eventual start
of production competition. This is the case currently with
the V-22 program where the Bell/Boeing team has expressed a
strong opinion that the team should not be split. The
dominant reason given is that the team believes it may be
better able to compete in the world market against
international competitors. What is being observed is that
the team may find the present contractual arrangement better
than the approaching competitive option and may attempt to
exercise the monopolistic power of a sole source. The
program office still plans for production of the V-22 to
begin in March 1990 with a split of the team for the second
year of production. It does not envision that discussions
about this topic will subside and believes that more time and
effort will have to be expended discussing this option.
[Ref. 39]
C. RESULTS OF SECOND SOURCING METHOD SELECTION MODEL
1. Critical Program Variables
Analysis of program variables indicates that five
variables are particulary significant to the second sourcing
decision of the AAAV. These variables are the economic
variables of "quantity", "duration", and "tooling cost", and
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the technical variables of "complexity and "state-of-the-
art".
The economic variables of "quantity" and "duration"
clearly indicate that a methodology that can introduce
competition early in production is mandated. If competition
is attempted three to four years after the production
decision, insufficient quantities will be available to recoup
the expense. The "tooling cost" is identified as a variable
that must be firmed up to permit an accurate economic
analysis. The difference between $50 million and $238
million warrants greater attention and confirmation as design
and manufacturing requirements are defined.
The technical variables of "complexity" and "state-
of-the-art" indicate that a methodology that decreases the
risk of technology transfer is warranted. Historical
problems in obtaining accurate TDP's, and the rate of
design/engineering changes experienced by new systems will
require face-to-face contractor exchange of data.
2. Comparision of Probable Second Sourcing Methodologies
Analysis of the established second sourcing methods
indicate that either the LF or CT methods present a higher
probability of meeting the criteria established by the
program variables, yet only one method can be followed. In
comparing the two methods it is best to analyze them against
how they meet the critical variables identified above.
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In regards to the economic variables, the CT method
receives higher ratings than does the LF method, with the CT
method receiving "neutral" ratings and the LF method
receiving "inappropriate" ratings. This apparantly reflects
the ability of the CT method to introduce production
competition earlier than the LF method and reflects the
constraints imposed by the low production quantity and short
production duration. The CT method then permits a more
favorable opportunity, with less risk, for the recoupment of
cost incurred in establishing the competitive environment.
In regards to the technical variables, the CT method
again receives higher ratings than the LF method, with the CT
method receiving ratings of "particulary appropriate", and
the LF method receiving ratings of "appropriate". Though
both methods reflect suitability for establishing
competition, these variables indicate that additional benefit
from participation in the systems development process can be
obtained from the CT method. This is achieved by the
participation of both contractors in the development phases
and the subsequent reduction of the risk involved with the
technology transfer.
3. Recommended Second Sourcing Methodology
After analysis of the critical variables that have
the potential for major impact on the procurement scenario
for the AAAV program, and the comparison of ratings between
these variables, the use of the CT methodology is
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recommended. This method presents advantages that minimize
the risks inherent with technology transfer and better
addresses the limiting economic variables which constrain the
use of other methods. The CT method presents the greater
possibility of success for the program while minimizing risk
exposure. In addition, since production competition is a
stated goal of the AAAV program the early commitment required
by a CT strategy should not pose a problem if an economic
analysis indicates that production competition is justified
in terms of projected monetary savings.
D. SUMMARY
This chapter presented an analysis of the economic,
technical, and management variables of the AAAV program, and
identified those critical variables that could have a
significant impact on the program. An analysis was then
performed which presented several possible advantages and
disadvantages associated with the use of each of the five
second sourcing methodologies. A recommendation was also
made that the Contractor Teaming method offered the most
credible method of introducing production competition. In
Chapter VII an economic analysis will be performed which will
present possible monetary costs and savings which could be
realized from pursuing the CT approach.
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VII. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SECOND SOURCE PRODUCTION
A. INTRODUCTION
In analyzing whether production competition is warranted
on an economic basis, the program manager must determine
whether the projected savings from competition between two
production sources provides sufficient savings in production
costs to recover the additional program costs of establishing
the second source. These additional costs include the
increased program costs of soliciting and managing two
sources, technology transfer costs, and primarily the cost of
the industrial facilities required by the second source [Ref.
4:p. 1-17].
As was described in Chapter II, the anticipated savings
from production competition result from an observed shift and
rotation of the progress curve once competition is
introduced, or once the threat of competition is considered
viable by the first source. An economic analysis can be made
using this observation by varying the progress curves for
dual sources and analyzing the effect of increasing the rate
of learning.
B. COST EQUATIONS
Using the progress curve concept, the individual cost of
a given numbered unit, i.e., 1000th, produced during a
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production which demonstrates a progress curve can be
determined from the equation: [Ref. 4: p. D-7]
B
Z = A * X (Equation 1)
Where Z = Cost of the Xth. unit
A = Cost of the first unit
X = Cumulative quantity produced
B = Log (progress curve)/Log (2)
Since this equation demonstrates a continuous function,
integration can be performed which provides an equation for
determining the area under the progress curve. This area
represents the cumulative cost of a given production lot or
of the entire production contract. This equation is: [Ref.
4:p. D-10]
B+l B+l
C(K,N) = (A/B+1)[N - K ] (Equation 2)
Where A = Cost of the first unit
N = Number of the last unit of a period
K = Number of the first unit of a
period
B = Log (progress curve)/Log (2)
The use of Equation 2 is sufficient to determine the cost
of a program when the contractor ( s ) demonstrate a progress
curve from the first unit produced and expect this curve to
continue throughout the production. With this formula, a
hypothetical competitive environment can be constructed which
will estimate the probable effect of competition on
production costs by introducing variations in the slopes of
progress curves for two competitors.
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C. FIRST UNIT "ROLLAWAY" PRICE
As indicated by the previous equations, the first piece
of data required to perform an economic analysis on the
possible effect of competition on a program is the expected
first unit cost of the system.
A Life Cycle Cost Estimate performed by Advanced
Technologies Inc. on 11 May 1988 for the AAAV program office
provided information which permits the determination of a
probable first unit "rollaway" cost for a hypothetical AAAV
[Ref. 30:p. 1-9]. Table V demonstrates the computation of
the projected first unit production cost.
D. COST OF ESTABLISHING A SECOND SOURCE
The cost of establishing a second source is the sum of
the non-recurring costs for industrial facilities and special
test equipment, and the recurring cost of any additional
program management expected due to the increased program
size. For the AAAV program the cost of establishing a second
source is estimated to be $74-$262 million. The basis of
this estimate follows.
1. Industrial Facilities
As previously discussed, this cost for the program is
expected to fall between $50 million and $238 million for a
facility capable of a production rate of 30-35 vehicles per
month. Normally in a dual sourcing effort the two sources
are facilitized at a rate approximately 60-70% of the planned
production rate. This facilitization provides both
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TABLE V
LIFE CYCLE COST ESTIMATE ( LCCE ) FIRST UNIT COST CONVERSION
HARDWARE ELEMENTS *LCCE COST PROGRESS CURVE FIRST UNIT COST
HULL AND FRAME 168,779 .9288 352,370
SUSPENSION 133,540 .9639 192,639
PROPULSION PLANT 231,216 .9548 362,316
AUTOMOTIVE DRIVE 325,316 .9345 639,007
MARINE DRIVE 334,594 .96 502,573
AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 211,517 1.00 211,517
TURRET ASSEMBLY 116,628 .918 273,593
ARMAMENT 74,638 .96 112,109
NAVIGATION AND 133,195 1.00 133,195
COMMUNICATION
FIRE CONTROL 339,489 .96 509,926
INTEGRATION AND 60,288 1.00 60,288
ASSEMBLY
TOTAL HARDWARE COST PER VEH. 3,349,533
NON-HARDWARE ELEMENTS
INDUSTRIAL 50,000,000 36,364 PER VEH.
FACILITIES
SYSTEM TEST AND 25,737,000 18,718 PER VEH.
EVALUATION




TOTAL COST PER VEH.






Note: -LCCE costs were computed at the 1000th. unit cost
using the indicated progress curve factor.
-All costs of production were included in the LCCE
estimate except profit. The profit shown was added to
allow for its the cost to the Government and can be
changed for comparison purposes.
-Progress curves used in the LCCE estimate were
obtained from various cost models which include the
Fighting Vehicle Cost Estimate, Tracked Vehicle
Resource and Display Model (TREAD), and the Landing
Vehicle Tracked Experimental (LVTX) Cost Estimate.
Source: Developed by the Researcher
* Source: Preliminary Life Cyc le Cost Estimate , 1988.
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contractors the capacity to compete for up to 70% of any
year's production award, and saves the Government the cost of
facilitizing both contractors to 100% of the planned rate.
It still, however, entails additional cost to the program
because the Government has paid for facilities capable of
producing at a rate equal to 130-140% of planned buys.
For the AAAV program this would imply that the cost
of facilitization should be 30-40% higher than the cost of
the facilities estimate for a sole source, and that
production sources should be facilitized at a rate of 21-25
vehicles per month (60-70% of the monthly rate). If this is
possible, it would reduce the cost to the Government of
introducing production competition and make the dual sourcing
decision more favorable. This may not, however, be feasible
on the AAAV program since the production rate planned for is
low by commodity standards. The difficulty the program may
face can be explained in the following manner. The machinery
that is required to produce the vehicle has certain inherent
capabilities that come with it; if one piece of equipment has
the capability of welding 30 hulls together per month, and
this is the smallest piece of equipment suitable for the
work, then it is not possible for less than one welder to be
procured. This means that two welders must be bought to do
the work that one would be capable of in a single plant. The
rate of 30-35 vehicles per month appears to be close to the
point where the Government will have to facilitize both
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contractors at 100% of planned capacity to have dual sources.
If this situation occurs, it means that an additional
production source will cost another $50 million to $238
million for facilities. [Ref. 31]
2 . Program Management
The use of two contractors for production means the
Government must pay for the increase effort in managing two
contractors, and the additional management structure of the
second production source. For the Government this might
entail additional personnel for the program office,
additional travel expenses, the cost of award fees/incentives
if used, and the added cost to the Government of having two
DCAS offices dealing with two production sources. The
current estimate for program management cost contained in the
LCCE is $49.1 million [Ref. 30:p. 1-12]. A detailed analysis
of this cost will depend on the second sourcing methodology
planned for use, and the nature and content of the contract
itself. Since no other method of calculating this cost
presents itself, it will be assumed that a 50% increase in
funding will be required for increased management. This
reflects an increase of approximately $23.5 million.
E. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF SECOND SOURCING
1 . General
Appendix C presents a sensitivity analysis which
reflects the probable monetary effects on the AAAV program
assuming the implementation of a CT strategy. As in any
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analysis, the projection of possible events can be
dramatically altered by entering either, optimistic, most
likely, or pessimistic variables into the equation. In
evaluating these projections it is helpful to remember that:
[Refs. 20:p. 14, 22:p. 52]
1. The previous production of the AAV7 family demonstrated
a 97% progress curve over four years utilizing one,
four year multiyear contract.
2. That the general price history of armor vehicles




The most favorable progress curve demonstrated in the
data is for the M113 which produced a 91% progress
curve over a 12 year period.
2. Contractor Teaming Economic Analysis Summary
The sensitivity analysis for a CT strategy provides
promising cost data for employing this strategy. At the
flattest end of the progress curve spectrum for a
hypothetical sole source, i.e., 97-100%, a one per cent
increase for both sources in learning due to competition
results in production cost savings of approximately $485
million at 100%, and $254 million at 97% . When an
optimistic expectation is considered and a learning increase
of 8-10% is employed, the program could realize production
cost savings of $3.4 billion at 100%, and $2 billion at 97%.
At the steeper ends of what has been historically
demonstrated for this commodity's progress curve for a
hypothetical sole source, i.e., 91-94%, a 1.5% increase in
learning results in approximate production cost savings of
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$238 million at 94%, and $215 million at 91%.
In projecting the monetary savings presented in
Appendix C, no allowance was made for the cost of
establishing the competitive environment. However, it is
apparent that even assuming the worst case scenario of
approximately $262 million dollars for increased program
costs incurred from introducing competition, that a second
sourcing effort is economically justifiable.
F. SUMMARY
This chapter presented information which allowed for the
determination of a "probable" First Unit Cost for the AAAV,
and range of values for the "probable" costs associated with
developing a second production source for the AAAV program.
This information, when used with equation 2, enabled an
economic analysis to be performed. This analysis, presented
in Appendix C, indicated that minor increases in the progress
curve caused by the introduction of production competition
could offer significant savings in total production costs to
the Government.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The focus of this research effort was to study the
effects of competition in the acquisition of weapon systems,
identify issues/variables that may affect the use of a
competitive strategy, identify competitive strategies that
are suitable for introducing competition into a program, and
evaluate these strategies as they apply to the U.S. Marine
Corps AAAV program. Based on this study the following
conclusions are made.
1 . The use of design competition appear s to stimulate
those efforts associated with desi gning the system, but
may result in higher production prices later by
encouraging the use of "buy-in" strategies by
contractors if only one contractor i s carr i ed forward
into FSD.
Design competition encourages innovation during the
design phase, but may encourage the use of "buy-in"
strategies by contractors if only one contractor is carried
forward into FSD for full system development. As in the M-l
program, cost may begin to escalate once competition is in
the past and opportunities begin to present themselves for
the contractor to request price increases. A goal of the
program should be to carry two contractors through FSD to
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maintain the benefits of competition as long as possible.
2
.
The introduction of production competition into the
acquisition of weapon systems results in a pattern of
unit price reductions.
The body of available research generally supports the
hypothesis that the introduction of production competition
will deliver reduced unit prices. A repeated pattern of
increased learning, indicated by a shift and rotation of the
progress curve when competition is introduced, has been
observed on a predominance of programs. This increase in
learning translates into price reductions in the out years of
the program, and delivers immediate savings relative to the
degree of shift experienced with the progress curve. Savings
also appear to be greater when a winner-take-all award vice a
split-buy award is made.
3 The Second Source Method Selection Model presents a
coherent system for identifying and evaluating
variabl e s that may affect the second sourcing decision.
The SSMSM has identified several variables that will be
critical factors in evaluating the second sourcing decision.
Chapter VI discussed how these variables relate to the AAAV
program and identified several variables as potential factors
that may increase the risk of the second sourcing decision.
In the economic area, they include the small procurement
quantity and the short duration of the production phase
coupled with the small production rate which may require
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tooling both sources to 100% of capacity. In the technical
area, the variables of "state-of-the-art" and "complexity"
indicate that the technology transfer may require a second
sourcing method that both minimizes the risk associated with




The varied characteristic s of different commodities
makes comparisons dealing with the effects of
competition between commoditie s difficult
.
The majority of research performed on the effects of
competition have been with missiles and other electronic
systems. The characteristics of these systems regarding
size, complexity, the possibility of utilizing the technology
arising from their development in commercial enterprises, and
the industrial base supporting the commodity make comparisons
between commodities an imprecise effort.
5 The Automotive commodity body of re search is limited
,
but suggests that the commodity responds to competition
w
i
th lower unit prices, and to the lack of competition
with higher unit prices over the long run.
The small body of research conducted to date on
automotive commodities such as armor vehicles makes analysis
difficult. The data suggest, however, though that Automotive
commodities do respond to a competitive environment in a
manner similar to other commodities. The most important fact
observed from the data is that in the absence of competition
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Automotive commodities seem to exhibit a pattern of unit
price increases over the life of the program, rather than the
increased learning and reduced prices often associated with
other commodities. Without some restraining factor the AAAV
program should not expect unit price decreases over the
production phase, but should plan for the definite
possibility of unit cost escalation.
6 . Early planning and commitment to an acquisition
strategy directed towards achieving a second production
source is critical to the succe s s of the effort.
The successful implementation of a second sourcing effort
begins with early planning and commitment to a suitable
strategy. Issues such as data rights, funding, preparation
of Technical Data Packages, solicitation and contracting with
the second source, and the qualification of a second source,
are only a few of the issues that must be resolved. If not
planned for during the early phases of the acquisition cycle
in CE and D&V, the lost opportunities to negotiate for data,
request and evaluate technology transfer plans, and commit
developers to the second sourcing effort while still under
the pressure of design competition will be lost. Programs
that have experienced difficulty with establishing production
competition generally have done so because of decisions made
years before which closed off certain avenues.
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7.
The SSMSM recommendation of employing Contractor
Teaming methodology is valid.
An evaluation of the AAAV program variables using the
SSMSM indicates that the most beneficial methodology for
introducing competition is the Contractor Teaming method.
This evaluation appears to adequately address the weaknesses
and risks associated with the program and offers the best
chance of achieving production competition. This is
primarily because this methodology reduces the risk of
technology transfer and offers the potential qualification of
the second source earlier in production with the resulting
capability of generating greater savings.
8
.
The extent of possible combination s of variables ) i n
concert with their numerous pos sibl e values makes
meaningful economic analysis of the affect of
developing production competit i on uncertain, but
nevertheless can still be effectively u sed to evaluate
and judge the risk to the progr am.
Performing an economic analysis judging whether the
projected savings from competition warrant the effort and
risk connected with the second sourcing effort i s an
uncertain endeavor which results in monetary values of
dubious merit. However, if the analysis is geared instead to
evaluating the necessary magnitude of change associated with
the progress curve once competition is introduced, it can be
a useful tool in evaluating the risk assumed by the program.
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This is to say that, if the analysis reveals that a one or
two per cent increase in the progress curve is enough to
recover the investment costs, then this case clearly warrants
more consideration and analysis than the case which requires
a much greater change in the progress curve.
B . RECOMMENDAT IONS
1
.
That the AAAV program commit to a Contractor Teaming
strategy early in the acquisiti on cycle
.
The Contractor Teaming methodology offers the most
benefits to the program while minimizing the risks associated
with developing production competition.
2 That the program office m aintain l iaison with other
programs employing the Contractor Teaming strategy to
follow the progress of other programs and learn from
their experiences.
Numerous programs of equal or greater complexity and size
are currently employing a Contractor Teaming strategy. These
programs include the ATF, ATA, V-22, ASPJ, LHX, AAWS-M and
the INEWS. Though none of these programs has reached
Milestone III and began full production, all are ahead of the
AAAV program and may possess valuable and timely information.
3 That as the design of the AAAV stabilizes the program
office take steps to tighten estimates of variables
that may have a maj or impact on determining whether a
final commitment to dual sources is warranted.
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Two such variables are the facilitation costs and the
quantity of vehicles to be produced. Concurrent with the FSD
phase, a requirement exists for a reliable estimate of
facilitation costs. The difference between the $50 million
suggested by FMC, and the $238 million suggested through
parametric estimates is obviously a significant spread that
must be resolved. In addition, the quantity to be produced
must be confirmed. The Marine Corps' need for 1500 vehicles
is a solid estimate based on past experience and identified
task organization requirements. However, an additional
requirement for 300-500 vehicles for foreign military sales
to any of the countries which will need to replace their
aging AAV5 and AAV7 vehicles may make a significant
difference to any analysis due to the low rate of production
planned. During FSD, foreign military sales representatives
at Headquarters, Marine Corps should endeavor to determine
the most likely estimate of this variable.
C. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1
. How might competitive procurement methodologies be
incorporated in the AAAV program's acquisition
strategy ?
Competitive procurement methodologies can be implemented
into the AAAV program's acquisition strategy in several ways.
During the CE phase, design competition will provide the
program with a variety of possible alternatives to evaluate.
Promising alternatives may be carried forward into D&V for
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further development and subjected to prototyping followed by
a "rolloff" competition. The best design from prototype
competition will then be chosen for entry into FSD where it
will be refined and tested for possible production.
To maintain the option of production competition, the
program must make early decisions regarding data rights and
in particular the methodology that offers the best chance of
success. This should entail encouraging the solicitation and
award of contracts to Contractor Teams entering CE and D&V,
but no later than FSD. This method will provide for the
greatest number of contractors participation in the program
for a minimal cost increase. The use of Contractor Teams
will provide the greatest possibility of production
competition even if only for the first production award.
2 . What is the AAAV program's acquisition strategy at this
time ?
Chapter V discusses the current AAAV acquisition
strategy. In summary the strategy calls for design
competition in both the CE and D&V phases, but will carry
forward only one contractor into FSD. The strategy plans for
full use of prototypes as encouraged by both DODD 5000.1 and
the Packard Commission.
Current planned options for production competition rest
on either the TDP or LF methods. The decision regarding the
use of either method will depend on analysis of pertinent
variables as the program matures.
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3.
What are the competitive is sues that must be considered
in evaluating, formulating and executi ng a competitive
strategy ?
Chapter VI discusses the primary variables dealing with
economic, technical, and program management areas.
Chapter IV highlights the major issue that this research
has revealed. This is that in the absence of competition, or
the threat of competition, armor vehicles have demonstrated a
marked and consistent tendency to increase in unit price
throughout the production phase. This issue can greatly
complicate the second sourcing decision in that not only must
the potential benefit of reduced prices be evaluated, but




If competitive procurement can be employed, what
method(s) will deliver the max imum benefits and
probability o f success to the program ?
This research has indicated that the Contractor Teaming
method delivers the most benefits and highest probability of
success, while simultaneously reducing the risk exposure of
the program. As discussed in Chapter VI, this method
provides for several advantages.
An increased level of flexibility is afforded the program
including the option of real production competition between
the team members. This can be realized by either a winner-
take-all award or split buy awards for production contracts.
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This is expected because both team members have been through
FSD and are thoroughly familiar with the program and it can
be assumed that they would desire to win the production
contract
.
An increase in the quality of technology transfer can be
expected since both contractors would have been involved with
the program for a minimum of the four years associated with
the FSD phase. Also, the experience received from being
involved with the prototyping effort and the knowledge
received through participation in DT/OT II testing can be
expected to be significantly greater than would be
experienced with either the LF or TDP methods.
The Contractor Teaming method also suggests that it may
entail the least cost risk/exposure than any other method.
This is because the government reduces its liability for
defective design specifications and is not required to
provide contract incentives or pay for a LF contract for
technology transfer.
The potential also exists for the earlier qualification
of a second source. Due to the expected small quantities and
short duration of the production contract production
competition will have to be initiated from at least the
second year to be financially justifiable. It is also highly
improbable that Congress would be willing to fund two
production sources with only two years left in the
production. Under such a circumstance it would be
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considerably safer for the program to request, and Congress
to grant, multiyear funding authority.
An increase in the quality of the design effort can be
expected from two contractors working together especially
during the competitive phases early in the acquisition cycle.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The AAAV program has the potential of costing five to six
billion dollars in production costs, and having a Life Cycle
Cost of nearly $20 billion. The use of production
competition at the prime contractor level is one method of
attempting to stabilize and reduce prices. Other methods
that might benefit this program and should be the basis for
further research are "Component Breakout" and "Design to
Cost"
.
Component Breakout would encourage development of
competition at the subcontractor level with the goal of
reducing prices for subsystems of the AAAV which would be
provided to the prime as Government Furnished Equipment
(GFE). Research in this area would also benefit the Life
Cycle Cost aspects of the system. Historical trends have
indicated that replacement parts for the AAV7A1 have been of
questionable quality and priced severely above what the parts
lists have indicated. Component Breakout also has the
potential of being used in conjunction with production
competition for greater savings.
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Design to Cost requirements are a DOD requirement for
major weapon systems. Since the AAAV program is currently
planning for design competition, research in this area might
benefit the programs cost reduction efforts by directing the
energy of contractors to designing a less costly system than
the $3.8 million per unit system currently envisioned. This
concept has historical backing in that the AAV7 family
produced during the 1970' s, and which replaced the AAV5
family produced in the 1950' s, cost $19 thousand less per
unit. This is a 15% reduction in price without taking
inflation of the 1970 dollars into account.
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APPENDIX A




All items small, perfectly
divisible, and in large
quantities
Market sets price
Free movement in and out
of market
Prices set by marginal costs
Prices fall with reduced
demand




Market shifts rapidly to









One ship built every
few years for millions
of dollars each
Monopoly or oligopoly












scale in region of
interest
7-10 years to develop a
new system, then 3-5
years to produce it
Erratic changes
from year to year











Perfect mobility of capital
(money)







Selection based on price
No externalities
Prices fixed by market
All products of a given
type are the same





judge of claims, etc.
Selection often based
on politics, or sole
source, or negotiation
All businesses working









frequently for all or
none of market
Production is for inventory Production occurs after
sale is made
Size of market established by
buyers and sellers














Benefits of the purchase go
to the buyer
Buyer has the choice of





DOD must spend its
annual congressional
authorization
Source: Thomas E. Bruns, LTC . USA, Competition in Contracting
Act: Free Market Illusion , 1987.
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APPENDIX B
PRICING HISTORY OF AUTOMOTIVE COMMODITIES
All contract pricing data found in the Tables in Appendix
B were obtained from: U.S. Tank-Automotive Command,
Competition in Automotive Commodities: Implications for
Competitive and Non-Competitive Acquisition , by Patrick
N. Watkins, September 1982.
All graphs in Appendix B were developed by the researcher
from the data obtained above.
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1 1 1 1 1 1 112 3 4 5 6 7
CONTRACT AWARD
Ml 06 SELF PROPELLED MORTAR
CONTRACT FY QTY DEC 80 CONSTANT DOLLARS
1 63 840 36,504 (C)
2 64 640 69,211
3 65 28 56,985 (C)
4 67 152 66 7833
5 69 302 60,290 (C)
6 72 1 91,125
7 73 24 97,022
D COMPETITIVE AWARDS
O SOLE SOURCE AWARDS
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1 82 3 4 5 6 7
CONTRACT AWARD
Ml 25 SELF PROPELLED MORTAR









65 363 59,589 (C)
67 509 68,970
67 95 75,840






























1 1 1 1 1 1
4 5 6 7 8 9
CONTRACT AWARD
1548 CARGO CARRIER
CONTRACT FY QTY DEC 80 CONSTANT DOLLARS
1 65 2455 48,723 (C)
2 . 67 507 57,000
3 67 412 71,103
4 67 120 75,191
5 73 285 76,578
6 73 188 75,368
7 74 116 78
;
543
8 76 64 71,691
9 77 275 70.989
COMPETITIVE AWARDS
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
CONTRACT AWARD
M109A1B Self Propelled Artillery

















































2 3 4 5
CONTRACT AWARD
M109A2 SELF PROPELLED ARTILLERY
CONTRACT FY QTY DEC 80 CONSTANT DOLLARS
1 76 12 259,295
2 77 353 277,257
3 78 267 293,902
4 79 242 361,773
5 80 187 247,839
O SOLE SOURCE AWARDS
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ANALYSIS OF THE COMPETITIVE PRODUCTION OF THE AAAV
CONTRACT TEAMING STRATEGY
This analysis makes the following assumptions:
That a Contract Teaming strategy was employed during
development with the result that production competition
began with the first year of production.
That 1500 vehicles will be produced over a four year
period, with production quantities being 200, 500, 500,
and 300 respectively, with a first unit cost of
$3,867,225 for each contractor.
That the minimum sustaining rate has been determined to
be 30% of production and that the maximum production
award will be 70% of the yearly rate. Bids will be
accepted from two production sources using the "Minimum
Total Cost" rule with bids being given for all
production quantities for 30% through 70% of yearly
production.
The first unit price for both contractors is the same.
Once a contractor is assigned a progress curve the
slope will not change throughout the four year
production. In addition once a lead source is
establish (that source with the steeper progress
curve), and a competitive source is established (that
source with the shallower progress curve), that this
relationship remains the same for the four year
production. This means that the competitive source
will never become the lead source, or vice versa, but
will continue production of the specified minimum
sustaining rate, i.e. 40%, for the four year
production.
That the forecast savings are the difference in total
production cost between the hypothetical sole source
production of 1500 vehicles utilizing his assigned
progress curve, and the total production cost of two
competitive contractors utilizing their assigned
progress curves.
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That no amount has been utilized in the calculations to
allow for the costs of establishing the second source
or in managing the increased size of the program.
8. That no variable for production rate has been
introduced, either to allow for additional learning or





















































































































































































HYPOTHETICAL SOLE SOURCE LEAD SOURCE COMPETITIVE SOURCE
,94 .94 .94





HYPOTHETICAL SOLE SOURCE LEAD SOURCE COMPETITIVE SOURCE
,94 .93 .93




70/30 3, 192,941,957 118,537,310
HYPOTHETICAL SOLE SOURCE LEAD SOURCE COMPETITIVE SOURCE
94 .925 .925





HYPOTHETICAL SOLE SOURCE LEAD SOURCE COMPETITIVE SOURCE
94 .91 .93





HYPOTHETICAL SOLE SOURCE LEAD SOURCE COMPETITIVE SOURCE
94 .88 .91

































































AAV Amphibian Assault Vehicle
AAAV Advanced Amphibian Assault Vehicle
AAWS-M Advanced Anti-Tank Weapon System-Medium
APC Armor Personnel Carrier
APRO Army Procurement Research Office
ASPJ Airborne Self-Protection Jammer
ATA Advanced Tactical Aircraft
ATF Advanced Tactical Fighter
BFV Bradley Fighting Vehicle
CE Concept Exploration
CICA Competition In Contracting Act
CT Contractor Teaming
DAB Defense Acquisition Board
DCAS Defense Contract Administration Service
DFAR Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations
DL Direct Licensing
DLSIE Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange
DOD Department of Defense
DODI Department of Defense Instruction
DT Demonstration Testing
DTC Design to Cost
DTIC Defense Technical Information Exchange
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D&V Demonstration and Validation
ECP Engineering Change Proposal
F3 Form, Fit, and Function
FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation
FSD Full Scale Development
FY Fiscal Year
GAO Government Accounting Office
GFE Government Furnished Equipment
GPLR Government Purpose License Rights
IOC Initial Operating Capability
IDA Institute of Defense Analysis
INEWS Integrated Electronic Warfare System
LCCE Life Cycle Cost Estimate
LF Leader-Follower
MBT Main Battle Tank
MRV Mission Role Variant
OT Operational Testing
PIC Price Improvement Curve
PTLD Physical Teardown Logistics Demonstration
RFP Request for Proposal
SLEP Service Life Extension Program
SSMSM Second Source Method Selection Model
TDP Technical Data Package
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